

27 AUGUST 1947

I N D E X
of
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
837-B		628-B	Certificate of Authenticity - Tentative Plan for Policy Towards Southern Regions (2d part of file entitled "Japanese Foreign Policy" dated 4 October 1940)		26892
837-C		628-C	Certificate of Authenticity - Concerning Recognition of the New National Govern- ment and Conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact (3d part of file entitled "Japanese Foreign Policy" dated 25 October 1940)		26892
837-D		628-D	Certificate of Authenticity - Instructions from the Foreign Minister to the Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary HONDA (a draft) 4th part of file entitled "Japanese Foreign Policy" dated 11 December 1940		26892
2082	3019		Affidavit of SATO, Takegoro		26895
2097	3020		Affidavit of MIYO, Tatsukichi		26909
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1 Wednesday, 27 August 1947

2 - - -
3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -
12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with
14 the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE I. M. ZARYANOV,
15 Member from the USSR., not sitting from 0930 to 1600.

16 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

17 For the Defense Section, same as before.
18 - - -

19 (English to Japanese and Japanese
20 to English interpretation was made by the
21 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's per-
4 mission, the accused TOGO will be absent from the
5 court-room between half-past nine and noon today.

6 Mr. Blewett.

7 MR. BLEWETT: If the Tribunal please, the
8 prosecution has assisted to some extent in closing up
9 the gap relative to exhibit No. 628, but the witness
10 SATO has quite important testimony to offer in connec-
11 tion with that, and I would like leave to call him to
12 read a portion of his affidavit.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

14 MR. TAVENNER: If the Tribunal please, the
15 three certificates were presented at the close of the
16 session, but no order was entered on filing. I would
17 suggest that upon being directed to file them they be
18 given exhibit numbers 628-B, C, and D, so as to connect
19 them with the former certificate.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Won't those certificates be
21 sufficient, Mr. Blewett?

22 MR. BLEWETT: No, sir.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have no objection
24 to them, I take it.

25 MR. BLEWETT: None.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
2 Please give them a number.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution documents
4 837-B, C, and D will be marked exhibits 628-B, C, and
5 D.

6 (Whereupon, the documents above referred
7 to were marked defense exhibits 628-B, C, and D,
8 respectively, and received in evidence.)

9 MR. BLEWETT: I call the witness SATO, Take-
10 goro.

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1 TAKEGORO SATO, called as a witness on
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

4 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be shown docu-
5 ment No. 2082?

6 (Whereupon, a document was handed to
7 the witness.)

8 DIRECT EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. BLEWETT:

10 Q Will you please give us your name and address?

11 A My name is SATO, Takegoro. My address is No.
12 346 Shimura-Hasune-Cho, Itabashi-ku, Tokyo.

13 Q What is your present occupation?

14 A Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
15 attached to the Secretariat of the Minister of Foreign
16 Affairs, Section of Archives.

17 Q Is defense document No. 2082 your affidavit?

18 A Yes.

19 Q Are the contents therein true and correct?

20 A Yes.

21 MR. BLEWETT: If the Tribunal please, before
22 reading any portion of the affidavit, we respectfully
23 recall to the Tribunal that exhibit 628, which is in
24 four parts and of which large sections of parts 1 and 2
25 have been read to the Tribunal, is the document to

1 which Mr. SATO's affidavit applies.

2 We also respectfully call the attention of
3 the Tribunal to the fact that certain portions that
4 were read by the French prosecution were again read
5 by the Netherlands prosecution in the Netherlands case.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Don't you require this affi-
7 davit to be admitted first, Mr. Blewett?

8 MR. BLEWETT: I was just about to offer it,
9 sir.

10 I offer in evidence defense document No.
11 2082.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2082
14 will receive exhibit No. 3018.

15 (Whereupon, the document above referred
16 to was marked defense exhibit No. 3018 and received
17 in evidence.)

18 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 3018,
19 beginning at the second paragraph:

20 "On October 2, 1946, a certificate was issued
21 by me on behalf of the Chief of the Archives Section
22 concerning the source and authenticity of the document
23 entitled the 'Outline of Foreign Policies of the
24 Japanese Empire' (dated September 28, 1940), which was
25 No. 837-A of International Prosecution Section.

1 "The aforesaid 'Outline of Foreign Policies
2 of the Japanese Empire' (dated September 28, 1940)
3 is in file, together with three other documents under
4 the cover bearing the title of 'Foreign Policies of the
5 Japanese Empire.' My certificate referred to above,
6 however, does not cover any of these three documents.

7 "One of the three documents entitled the" --
8 the word "tentative" should be in there, sir -- 'Tenta-
9 tive Draft of the Japan's Policies toward the Southern
10 Regions' (dated October 4, 1940) and typed on Japanese
11 paper, 9 pages in all, bears no name of the compiler,
12 nor are there any seal or signatures affixed thereto
13 of the persons concerned with the matter or those who
14 examined the document. Consequently, it is not clear
15 whether or not the original of this document was pre-
16 pared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

17 THE PRESIDENT: Is there any correction? I
18 think there is. We have an exhibit 3018 already.

19 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2082
20 will receive exhibit 3019.

21 (Whereupon, the document above referred
22 to, having been previously marked defense exhibit
23 3018, was marked defense exhibit 3019 and received
24 in evidence.)

25 MR. BLEWETT: It was 3019 I read, then, Mr.

Reporter, instead of 3018.

1 If the Tribunal please, in view of the offer
2 made by the prosecution, may I be permitted to put one
3 or two questions to the witness?

4 THE PRESIDENT: You may.

5 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness please be shown
6 the original document in Japanese?

7 ("Whereupon, a document was handed to the
8 witness.")

9 The witness is being shown the original of
10 exhibit 628.

11 BY MR. BLEWETT:

12 Q Have you examined the original exhibit, Mr.
13 SATO?

14 A Yes.

15 Q How many separate papers are contained there-
16 in?

17 A Four separate documents.

18 Q To what document does your affidavit refer?

19 A The certificate I made out on the 2nd of Oc-
20 tober covers the document entitled "Outline of Foreign
21 Policies of the Japanese Empire."

22

23

24

25

1 Q On the affidavit, in the last paragraph, you
2 refer to one of three documents. Now --

3 A The one of three documents I referred to is
4 entitled, "Tentative Draft of Japanese Policies
5 Toward the Southern Regions," dated October 4, 1940.

6 Q Now, how does this document differ, if it does
7 differ in any way, from document No. 1?

8 A May I have the meaning of the question ex-
9 plained?

10 Q From your point of view as an official of the
11 Foreign Office, is there any difference in the docu-
12 ments in so far as authorization is concerned between
13 No. 1 and No. 2?

14 A I do not think there is any difference.

15 Q What constitutes an official document of the
16 Japanese Foreign Office?

17 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

18 MR. TAVENNER: Objection.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.

20 Q Can we understand from your affidavit, Mr.
21 SATO, that it is not known whether or not the tenta-
22 tive draft of October 4, 1940, denotes a decision of
23 any Japanese Government section?

24 THE PRESIDENT: We will not permit him to tell
25 us what his affidavit means. There are no special terms

1 or phrases that require elucidation.

2 Q Are there any markings on document No. 1
3 which would indicate to you that it is an official
4 document?

5 A In the Foreign Office, official documents --
6 official documents of the Foreign Office are docu-
7 ments filed in the Foreign Office, and any documents
8 whose contents have something to do with the activities
9 of the Foreign Office as an organ of the government
10 are called official documents.

11 Q Are there any markings on document No. 1?

12 A There is only the seal "Very Secret."

13 Q Are there any signatures or any indication
14 referring to persons concerned with the matter?

15 A There are no signatures, but there are inter-
16 lineations.

17 Q Are there any marks or signatures affixed to
18 document No. 2?

19 A There are no signatures or markings. It
20 bears only the seal "Secret."

21 Q From what examination of the document did you
22 make your affidavit, particularly with regard to the
23 third and last paragraph?

24 MR. TAVENNER: Objection is made, if the Tri-
25 bunal please, on the ground that he is asking for some

1 construction of the language of the document.

2 THE PRESIDENT: No, I think Mr. Blewett is
3 asking, was there anything in the document which
4 justifies this statement in his affidavit.

5 MR. BLEWETT: That is my intention, sir.

6 You may answer, Mr. Sato.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know that the
8 last statement in the affidavit calls for any ex-
9 planation as to how he arrived at his conclusion. He
10 just states a number of things from which he invites
11 us, I suppose, to draw a conclusion.

12 MR. BLEWETT: I thought it might be helpful,
13 sir, if he told us the difference between No. 1 and
14 No. 2.

15 THE PRESIDENT: I don't know whether it would
16 be or not, but this is a very painful attempt to get
17 him to repudiate his own certificate. It is never
18 edifying.

19 MR. BLEWETT: No.

20 THE PRESIDENT: People do correct mistakes
21 occasionally, but that is not what he intended. He
22 knew as much when he gave that certificate as he knows
23 now, and nothing appears to have been mistaken by him.

24 MR. BLEWETT: Sir, he gave his certificate on
25 the paper of 28 September 1940. That is quite all

1 right. That is the only certificate he gave, but
2 when the --

3 THE PRESIDENT: What about the three certifi-
4 cates that have been tendered to Mr. Tavenner?

5 MR. BLEWETT: Sir, he didn't make that affi-
6 davit. He didn't sign those three certificates.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Is he attacking somebody
8 else's certificate?

9 MR. BLEWETT: Sir, the proposition is this:
10 Mr. Sato certified to one paper, one document dated
11 28 September, except when the prosecution introduced
12 exhibit No. 628, they also quoted from No. 2, which the
13 certificate did not cover.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Am I right in saying that
15 prosecution's evidence is covered by a number of cer-
16 tificates and that this man is attacking some of them?

17 MR. BLEWETT: No, sir. He knew nothing about
18 these three certificates, before he came into court,
19 until yesterday. Our only purpose in bringing the
20 witness in was to show clearly to the Tribunal that
21 the certificates did not cover No. 2 which was read by
22 the French and the Netherlands.

23 THE PRESIDENT: But he goes on to attack the
24 accuracy of the other document as an official document.

25 I do not know who gave the last three

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1 certificates. We have not been supplied with them,
2 and you have not read them.

3 MR. BLEWETT: This affidavit, sir, simply
4 shows that No. 2, which was read as an opinion of
5 this official of the Foreign Office, is not an
6 official document. At least there is some doubt
7 about it.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Can he add to his reasons for
9 thinking that? He has told us on what he bases that
10 belief.

11 MR. BLEWETT: I think it has been covered
12 fully, sir.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

14 CROSS-EXAMINATION

15 BY MR. TAVENNER:

16 Q Were you shown yesterday afternoon or this
17 morning the three certificates that I introduced in
18 evidence yesterday?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Those certificates were signed by your superior,
21 Mr. HAYASHI, were they not?

22 A Yes.

23 Q You are his assistant?

24 A That is so.

25 Q Are they correct or not?

A I think they are accurate.

1 Q Then according to your present statement
2 all four of these documents were documents of the
3 Foreign Office?

4 A Yes.

5 Q You stated that there was a seal known as
6 "Very secret" that appeared on document No. 1. Does
7 the identical seal appear on each of the four documents?
8

9 A The other three documents also bear the seal
10 "Very secret."

11 Q Is each page of each document on Foreign
12 Office stationery?

13 A Yes.

14 Q And does each page contain the Japanese words
15 meaning Foreign Office?

16 A Do you mean on the paper?

17 Q Yes.

18 A Yes.

19 Q Is there an index or frontispiece which
20 includes the topic and in addition refers to each of
21 the documents by numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4?

22 A Yes.

23 Q And then does each document itself contain
24 the appropriate number 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively?

25 A The documents themselves do not bear numbers.

1 Q Are those documents separated by pink sheets
2 which bear the respective numbers of the documents?
3 I believe I was mistaken about their being pink sheets.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Tangerine.

5 THE INTERPRETER: The witness replied: The
6 documents are separated.

7 Q And does each of those separating sheets
8 contain the numbers of the respective documents,
9 1, 2, 3 and 4?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Now will you examine the document No. 2 and
12 see if there is a small slip of paper affixed thereto
13 which has a blue pencil notation in the form of a
14 marginal note?

15 A Yes, I note a piece of paper bearing blue
16 pencil writing.

17 Q I will read you what that note says and you
18 state whether or not it is correct: "As to the
19 utilization of Chiang's army in disposing of Indo-
20 China and other territories, I think the best thing
21 would be, of course, to achieve a plan vis-a-vis
22 Chiang which would not involve such utilization of
23 his army.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Tavenner, which "Chiang"
25 is this, Chiang Kai-shek?

1 MR. TAVENNER: Yes.

2 A I would like to have that repeated.

3 Q Suppose you read what you see written there.

4 A The first two words are unreadable. I will
5 continue after that. "If these moves vis-a-vis Chiang
6 Kai-shek could be carried out without the utilization
7 of his army that would be the best way."

8 Q Do you know who in the Foreign Ministry,
9 if anyone, put that notation on the document?

10 A I investigated this matter rather extensively
11 but was unable to find out.

12 Q Now, the document No. 3 has the notation on it
13 "completed" followed by the name "YAMAMOTO", does it not?

14 A There is no notation but outside the border
15 of the document there is a signature "YAMAMOTO".

16 Q And with the word "completed," meaning
17 completed there, too; is it not?

18 A Above the name or signature YAMAMOTO there is
19 a mark or character signifying finished.

20 Q And the same seal appears on the fourth
21 document the name "YAMAMOTO," does it not?

22 A Yes, there is a seal impressed.

23 Q And what was the position of YAMAMOTO?

24 A I have no recollection.

25 Q Does it not appear that he was Chief of the

1 East Asia Bureau Section. It appears, I think, on
2 page 3 of the last document.

3 A I can't find it on page 3.

4 (Whereupon, counsel indicated to the
5 witness.)

6 A (Continuing) Yes, outside of the border
7 there is a seal, "Chief of the East Asia Bureau,"
8 and underneath that seal, YAMAMOTO's signature.

9 Q You had not considered those matters before
10 when you prepared your affidavit, had you?

11 A My affidavit relates only to documents 1 and
12 2, and not to 3 and 4.

13 Q Would you see whether the name of KITA as
14 Chief of the First Section also appears at the place
15 that I just mentioned to you?

16 A It appears to me like KIDA and I have no
17 recollection of that name. It might be some smearing
18 of the seal when it was pressed.

19 Q Is the YAMAMOTO referred to there the YAMAMOTO
20 who, as a former member of the Foreign Office, testi-
21 fied before this Tribunal a few days ago, that is,
22 Kumaichi YAMAMOTO?

23 A I think so.

24 MR. TAVENNER: That is all.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. BLEWETT:

2 Q Mr. SATO, do you know whether or not there
3 is any record of a permanent draft of Japan's policies
4 toward the Southern Regions that is connected in any
5 way with this tentative draft?
6

7 MR. TAVENNER: I object, if the Tribunal
8 please, on the ground that it is not a matter arising
9 out of cross-examination.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I cannot see how it is
11 either, Mr. Blewett. Would you like to explain?

12 MR. BLEWETT: It seems to me it certainly
13 indicates if the permanent program was laid out based
14 upon this as to whether or not this really was formu-
15 lated by the Foreign Office. It is a tentative draft.
16 It may have come from the outside some place and may
17 never have been used.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.

19 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be excused,
20 your Honor, on the usual terms?

21 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused on the usual
22 terms.

23 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

24 MR. BLEWETT: If the Tribunal please, I refer
25 once more to exhibit 2344 which is the Cabinet chart

1 and respectfully suggest to the Tribunal that when
2 the army made its entrance into South Indo-China in
3 July 1941 the third KONOYE Cabinet was in power and
4 of sixteen members of that cabinet but three of these
5 defendants were members: General TOJO was War
6 Minister; HIRANUMA and SUZUKI, as ministers without
7 portfolio.

8 We respectfully call the attention of the
9 Tribunal to exhibits 2753, 2754, 2755 and 2756 start-
10 ing on page 24,687 of the record to show that in
11 July 1941 the French government came to an agreement
12 with Japan concerning the entry of troops into South
13 Indo-China without any pressure from the German
14 government. Those references are on the first and
15 second pages of the respective exhibits.

16 I refer to exhibit 2830 to show that the
17 minds of the Vichy and Japanese governments had been
18 amicably reached as early as 21 July 1941 although the
19 protocol was not signed until 29 July.

20 We refer to prosecution exhibit No. 651,
21 page 7079 of the record, and call the attention of the
22 Tribunal to that portion in which Japan undertakes to
23 respect the right of France in East Asia and especially
24 the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and
25 the sovereign rights of France in all parts of the

Indo-China union.

1 I understand, sir, that the witness HIGASA
2 who was next in order is not present at the time and
3 I shall call the witness MIYO.
4

5 T A T S U K I C H I M I Y O, recalled as a witness
6 on behalf of the defense, having been previously
7 sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters as
8 follows:

9 THE PRESIDENT: You are still on oath, Witness.

10 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be shown defense
11 document No. 2097.

12 I presume, sir, his name and address is on
13 record.

14 DIRECT EXAMINATION

15 BY MR. BLEWETT:

16 Q Is that your affidavit, Captain?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Are the contents therein true and correct?

19 A I should like to make one correction. The
20 correction refers to the first new paragraph on the
21 second page. I should like to change, "beginning of
22 July 1941," to read, "late in June 1941," or, "it was
23 about the latter part of June 1941."
24

25 MR. BLEWETT: I think "late in June" will
cover that all right.

1 With that correction, sir, I offer in evidence
2 defense document No. 2097.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2097
5 will receive exhibit No. 3020.

6 (Whereupon, the document above
7 referred to was marked defense exhibit
8 No. 3020 and received in evidence.)

9 The following is what I was enabled to
10 learn, at that time, by virtue of my official posi-
11 tion, concerning the advance of Japanese forces to
12 South French Indo-China, which took place while I
13 was on duty in the Navy General Staff.

14 At the time of my assumption of office
15 in the Navy General Staff, it was a consistent
16 policy pursued not only by the Navy, but by the
17 entire nation, to try and effect a speediest possible
18 settlement of the China affair.

19 When Japan's complicated land questions in
20 China had reached such a situation as requiring the
21 enforcement of economic sanctions against China as an
22 all-important factor in the solution of the problem,
23 our attitude toward South French Indo-China
24 was governed by various economic and political
25 considerations, but what we, as parties directly

1 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 3020:

2 "I was formerly a navy captain.

3 "During the period from November 1939 to
4 December 1942, I served as a commander in the Opera-
5 tions Section of the Navy General Staff in the
6 capacity of a staff officer of the Imperial Head-
7 quarters, taking charge of affairs relative to aerial
8 operations.

9 "The following is what I was enabled to
10 learn, at that time, by virtue of my official posi-
11 tion, concerning the advance of Japanese forces to
12 South French Indo-China, which took place while I
13 was on duty in the Navy General Staff.

14 "1. At the time of my assumption of office
15 in the Navy General Staff, it was a consistent
16 policy pursued not only by the Navy, but by the
17 entire nation, to try and effect a speediest possible
18 settlement of the China affair.

19 "Now, Japan's deadlocked land operations in
20 China had created such a situation as requiring the
21 enforcement of economic blockade against China as an
22 all-important factor in the solution of the Incident.

23 "Our advance to South French Indo-China
24 was prompted by various economic and political
25 necessities, but what we, as parties directly

1 concerned in military operations, felt most imperative
2 of all reasons for this action was the necessity to
3 avert a collapse of our national defense for one
4 thing, and, for another, to bring the China affair
5 to an early conclusion by means of an over-all economic
6 blockade of our hostile neighbor.

7 "It was late in June 1941, if I remember
8 right, that the First Department Chief of the Navy
9 General Staff, while ordering us operation officers
10 to make preparations for the proposed move to French
11 Indo-China, initiated us into the reason briefly in
12 the following terms why such a step was inevitable.

13 "Much to the obstruction of our intended
14 conclusion of the China affair, the Anglo-American
15 aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime through the south-
16 western part of China is growing increasingly
17 vigorous. Worse still, the United States, Britain,
18 China and the Netherlands are acting in concert,
19 forming against our country the so-called 'A B C D
20 Line.' They are pushing on with their steady war
21 preparations and at the same time hardening their
22 economic pressure upon us. Here, in illustration of
23 this fact, we may take the failure of the Japan-
24 Dutch-India negotiations as one of the most outstand-
25 ing cases.

1 "What is more, their evil influence is now
2 reaching for French Indo-China and Thailand; and in
3 fact, there are indications that the de Gaullist
4 Partisans and other anti-Japanese elements in French
5 Indo-China are, in collusion with the Britishers,
6 inducing all French Indo-China to go over to the
7 Anglo-American camp. There is indeed an un-
8 mistakable possibility of its becoming another
9 Syria. If so, it is ten to one that Thailand will
10 allow herself to be won over to the Anglo-American
11 group in view of her prevailing domestic and
12 foreign relations.

13 "Should such a situation be created, the
14 A B C D front would be invincibly fortified, forc-
15 ing Japan to be completely isolated and shattering
16 our project of blockading China whereby early to
17 settle the Incident. Suppose we had our economic
18 relations with Thailand and French Indo-China broken
19 off, what would be the result? Excluded from Anglo-
20 American trade as we actually are and with the
21 economic negotiations with the Netherlands East
22 Indies ending in failure, Japan would now suffer an
23 economic collapse and be forced to fall on her knees
24 before the joint A B C D pressure, to speak nothing
25 of a successful settlement of the China affair.

1 "Suppose that British and some other allied
2 forces made a move into French Indo-China, it would
3 be very probable that the de Gaullist elements and
4 other anti-Japanese groups, would work together with
5 these occupation troops, and provoke our forces
6 stationed in North French Indo-China to a clash with
7 them, which would ultimately lead to serious con-
8 sequences.

9 "If we wish to prevent such an unhappy
10 event to occur, the only possible way for us, though
11 not a desirable one, is to get ahead of other powers
12 by ourselves dispatching troops to South French
13 Indo-China. There is no alternative.

14 "Speaking from the French standpoint, she
15 will surely welcome the idea of defending her posses-
16 sion in East Asia conjointly with Japan, with a view
17 to preventing it from becoming a second Syria.

18 "2. Relative to the advance of Japanese
19 troops to South French Indo-China, I will mention
20 two facts.

21 "(1) When I took office in the Navy General
22 Staff, I found that the Navy had already been on its
23 guard against Japan being involved in World War II.

24 "The Navy had been consistently opposed to
25 our country entering into an alliance with Germany

1 and Italy, for fear that such a move on our part
2 would cause increasing friction with the United
3 States and Britain, and, moreover, would imply a
4 danger for our country being embroiled in war.

5 "Our Navy, after the conclusion of the
6 Tripartite Pact, took special caution so that the
7 Pact might not unnecessarily impose fighting obliga-
8 tions on Japan. It absolutely refrained from re-
9 ferring to any idea of concerted military operations
10 with Germany and Italy or similar courses of action;
11 for we were in dread that if we should unwittingly
12 talk about such as any possible agreement among the
13 three nations for joint military operations, Germany
14 and Italy would at once take the Japanese Navy to be
15 disposed to join in the war, and would even try to
16 compel us under the terms of the Pact to fight
17 their battles.

18 "Such was the precaution that was adopted
19 by the Japanese Navy at the time of Japan's occupa-
20 tion of South French Indo-China, and this precautions
21 attitude on the part of our Navy was kept up to the
22 time immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific
23 War. It is obvious from this fact that before the
24 opening of the Pacific War there had been no joint
25 operation agreement existing among Japan, Germany and

Italy.

1 "(2) When the Japanese military move to
2 South French Indo-China was launched, we staff
3 officers who were responsible for the formulation of
4 war plans had no mention whatsoever for war in the
5 Pacific area, nor had we any plans or preparations
6 under such intention. It may clearly be seen from
7 this that the Japanese advance to South French Indo-
8 China was no preliminary step that had been taken in
9 readiness for the Pacific War.
10

11 "When I first came to make arrangements for
12 the advance to South French Indo-China of our troops,
13 I was much annoyed to find that there was no ade-
14 quate military information available concerning the
15 place. For instance, when I wanted to know about
16 its airfield, I found there was no data to work upon
17 other than those materials collected by civilian
18 interests, and it was from these meager materials
19 that I managed somehow to get general ideas. The
20 fact-finding survey that was conducted on the spot
21 after our entry into the region revealed numerous
22 errors in our previous calculation.
23

24 "Immediately before the advance of our
25 troops to South French Indo-China the United States,
Britain, and the Netherlands almost simultaneously

1 cut off economic relations with us and placed a ban
2 on their oil exports to Japan. Japan, thus taken
3 by surprise, endeavored to get the strained situa-
4 tion eased in any way, but there was no prospect of
5 her efforts meeting with success; on the contrary
6 things continued to go from bad to worse, with dark
7 clouds hovering overhead. The outcome of all this
8 was the September 6 decision of our National policy.

9 "Immediately following the above decision
10 came orders from our Section Chief in which he said
11 that the Government had decided to make preparations
12 for war that might break out any moment at the A B C D
13 front, and that we operations officers should begin
14 without delay to study and formulate plans of
15 campaign in line with the government policy. To me,
16 as one of the officers in charge of air operations,
17 it appeared a sheer absurdity to try to fight against
18 the four Powers when we were finding the single China
19 affair too much for us. So I said to the Section
20 Chief: 'With our air force so poorly equipped, we
21 can't expect to wage war on the four Powers with
22 confidence of success.' Thereupon the chief said
23 admonishingly: 'It is not the question of our
24 going into war because we are sure of success, or
25 staying out of it because we are not sure of it.

1 We are simply forced to be ready for any eventual-
2 ity of war for the sake of self-defense. It is not
3 for a war of our choice that we now stage prepara-
4 tions.'

5 "Faithfully following this admonition of
6 our Section Chief's, we now set to work on the pre-
7 paration of military operational plans for a self-
8 defensive war in assumption that such might occur and
9 it was with this intention that we pushed on with
10 our undertakings. It was about the beginning of
11 September, that is more than a month after the
12 Japanese military occupation of South French Indo-
13 China, that we started to formulate plans with a
14 view to the possibility of a conflict with the four
15 powers which ultimately developed into the Pacific
16 War."

17 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
18 minutes.

19 (Whereupon, at 1045 a recess was
20 taken until 1100, after which the proceed-
21 ings were resumed as follows:)
22
23
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1 THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: May it please the Tribunal,
5 with regard to the paragraph in the middle of page 3
6 of the affidavit, beginning with, "The Navy had been
7 consistently opposed to our country entering into
8 an alliance with Germany and Italy," the prosecu-
9 tion desires to refer the Tribunal to the following
10 exhibits.

11 THE PRESIDENT: I do not recall excusing
12 the witness.

13 (Whereupon, the witness resumed the
14 stand.)

15 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Carr, you may pro-
16 ceed.

17 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, my friend,
18 Mr. BANNO, says he desires to ask some further ques-
19 tions in direct examination.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. BANNO.

21 MR. SHIMANOUCI: I am counsel SHIMANOUCI.

22 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

23 BY MR. SHIMANOUCI:

24 Q To what extent was the witness connected
25 with the drafting of operations plans of the Navy

1 General Staff-- were you connected with the drafting
2 of the operations plans of the Navy General Staff?

3 A I was principally in charge of air operations,
4 but in modern warfare there is hardly no operations
5 that do not include the element or the importance of
6 air operations, and because of that I have been
7 associated with operations of all types -- nearly
8 all operations of every type.

9 Q In 1941 how many persons were there in the
10 operations section of the Navy General Staff?

11 THE PRESIDENT: We do not want to know that.
12 How is the accused OSHIMA interested in getting an
13 answer to a question like that?

14 MR. SHIMANOUCI: May I answer?

15 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I have
16 asked you a question, and I expect you to answer.

17 MR. SHIMANOUCI: By this question I am
18 trying to establish to what extent the witness was
19 connected with the drafting of operations plans.
20

21 THE PRESIDENT: You will not show that by
22 asking how many others were associated.

23 MR. SHIMANOUCI: Then I shall ask the next
24 question.

25 Q Between January and May of 1941 did the
operations section of the Navy General Staff draft copy

1 plans for the purpose of soon carrying out attacks on
2 Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines, and
3 was it making preparations for these attacks?

4 A No.

5 MR. SHIMINOCHI: Your Honor, my first
6 question was in order to place emphasis upon this
7 question -- place weight upon this question -- the
8 purpose of my first question was to give weight to
9 the witness' reply.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Your ideas of relevancy and
11 remoteness are entirely different from mine; I can
12 see that.

13 MR. SHIMANOCHI: This concludes my direct
14 examination.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: May it please the Tribunal,
17 with regard to the paragraph on page 3 of the affidavit,
18 rather more than halfway down, beginning, "The Navy
19 had been consistently opposed to our country entering
20 into an alliance with Germany and Italy," and the
21 following paragraph, the prosecution merely wishes to
22 refer the Tribunal to the following exhibits: exhibit
23 527, record page 6191; exhibit 528, record page 6212;
24 exhibit 552, record page 6350; exhibit 576, record
25 page 6476; and then, I am afraid out of order,

1 exhibit 536, record page 6262; and exhibit 537,
2 record page 6263. And I desire to ask the witness
3 a few questions relating to the last page, based
4 upon parts of exhibit 809, which are in evidence but
5 have not been read to the Tribunal.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. COLYNS CARR:

8 Q You say that it was not until after the
9 Imperial Conference decision of September 6 that
10 plans and preparations were made for war against the
11 United States or the British Commonwealth -- I said --
12 or the Netherlands East Indies; is that so?

13 A Yes.

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1 Q Now, you were a staff officer taking charge
2 of affairs relative to aerial operations from November
3 1939 onwards.

4 The question I am about to put is based upon
5 the second paragraph on page 1 of exhibit 809 with
6 the number 1.

7 In January 1941, was an aerial reconnaissance
8 made and a map prepared of that part of the coast of
9 northeast Malaya which includes Kotabharu?

10 A Do you mean that an aerial reconnaissance
11 was made in January 1941, and that a map was made the
12 same month?

13 Q Yes.

14 A I have no clear recollection, only a very
15 faint one, about some aerial reconnaissance having
16 been conducted; but I have no recollection whether
17 any map was made.

18 Q What was the object of the reconnaissance?

19 A In the past the Japanese navy had no opera-
20 tions plans with regard to defense against Britain,
21 and for that reason data with respect to any operations
22 vis-a-vis Britain were extremely incomplete. And so
23 peacetime defensive plans against England were begun
24 to be studied from about November, if I remember
25 correctly, of the year 1940 as a part of the over-all

Japanese defense plan.

1 Q Do you call an invasion of another country
2 so many miles away a defensive plan?

3 A For instance, if the British establish a
4 super base, naval base, close to Japan and if the
5 British fleet approaches into -- close to Japanese
6 home waters, and if Japan's line of communications
7 with the south were disrupted or entirely cut off,
8 then that would cause a very serious question for
9 Japan.
10

11 Q Now, was it a coincidence that that place of
12 which you made the reconnaissance in January was the
13 precise spot on which the Japanese invasion force
14 landed on the 8th of December, 1941?

15 A May I at this point state, Mr. Prosecutor,
16 that I would be considerably confused if you asked
17 one question after another before my previous reply
18 has been completed. But leaving that aside, I will
19 reply to your last question.

20 With respect to landing operations, there
21 are not many appropriate points for such operations,
22 and so, for instance, if an aerial reconnaissance is
23 conducted over the eastern coast of Malaya, then
24 naturally there would be in that particular area, an
25 appropriate place for landing.

1 Q What you mean is that you chose that area
2 to have the reconnaissance because you thought it was
3 an appropriate place for landing, don't you?

4 A No. What I am stating is just the contrary.
5 The purpose of the aerial reconnaissance was to find
6 out whether there were any appropriate places for
7 landing operations, and if such points made possible
8 such landing operations, and it so happened that it
9 was in that particular area over which an aerial
10 reconnaissance was conducted that an appropriate land-
11 ing place was found, and that could occur as a natural
12 matter.

13 Q After the reconnaissance, was the hydrographic
14 office set to work to make a complete map, and was
15 that completed in July 1941?

16 A I was not connected with such particulars,
17 so I do not know.

18 Q But did not the results come to you in the
19 Naval General Staff and enable you to issue a detailed
20 map of that area, the scale of 1:28,000, in October
21 1941?

22 A We in the Operations Section, in carrying
23 on our operational studies, would ask for necessary
24 data from the Third Division of the Naval General
25 Staff, namely, the division handling intelligence.

1 And so such a demand or an order may have been issued,
2 but I do not know how the Third Division went about
3 making -- placing such orders or requests.

4 Q Well, now, I will ask you a question based --
5 your Honor -- upon the paragraph numbered 3 on page 4.

6 When the invasion of the Philippines took
7 place, did the whole or part of the troops concerned
8 come from Manchuria?

9 A Nothing of that kind occurred with reference
10 to naval personnel.

11 Q Did the navy fetch the troops from there --
12 convoy them from there?

13 A It is not in my recollection, because I was
14 not in direct charge or direct association with the
15 matter.

16 Q Do you know that training for that particular
17 operation had been taking place in Manchuria since
18 the 27th of July, 1941?

19 A I do not know.
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1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Now, with regard to para-
2 graph 4 on the same page, your Honor, of 809.

3 Q What part did you take in the naval war games
4 which took place in Japan in August and early September,
5 1941?

6 A My recollection is very faint with regard to
7 war games. What particular war games of the Japanese
8 Navy are you referring to?

9 Q I am referring to those which took place during
10 August at various places -- Sukumo, Saiki, Kagoshima
11 and Kanoya -- and afterwards, at the end of August and
12 beginning of September, took place in Tokyo, first of
13 all at the offices of the Naval General Staff, and then,
14 because those were not large enough, in the Naval War
15 College.

16 A I do not know anything about it. And I have
17 therefore not participated in war games held at Saiki
18 and Kagoshima and therefore know nothing about that.

19 Q Did you participate in those held in Tokyo?

20 A You said that war games were held in Tokyo at
21 the General Staff Office, but because the place was
22 inadequate it was transferred to the Naval War College.

23 Q Yes.

24 A But no such fact exists. But, during the month
25 of August chart maneuvers were conducted at the Naval

1 War College. That was about all. And in those partic-
2 ular games I did participate.

3 Q Yes. And did those maneuvers include a com-
4 plete rehearsal of the Pearl Harbor Operation?

5 A Whether they called it complete or incomplete
6 that would be difficult to say, but a private draft-plan
7 involving such operations was incorporated. But, with
8 regard to those operations, I have already explained
9 in detail in my previous affidavit.

10 Q Yes, but when? Did not this maneuver take place
11 in **August** and did not the final stage of it begin on the
12 2nd of September?

13 A That is not so. It was conducted in the middle
14 part of September.

15 Q Was it attended by umpires from the Naval General
16 Staff and from the Navy Ministry?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Was there a team called the "N" Team, supposed
19 to represent Nippon, drawn from the Combined Fleet under
20 Admiral YAMAMOTO?

21 A Generally, yes. I think the commander of those
22 games was the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet. I
23 do not have any recollection of such letters as "N" being
24 used. I have a feeling that it might have been "Blue" or
25 something to that effect.

1 Q Was there another team called the "E" Team
2 supposed to represent the British Commonwealth?

3 A Generally, I think it was carried out in this
4 manner.

5 Q And was that under Admiral KONDO?

6 A I do not know who the commander of the "Red"
7 Force was.

8 Q Was there a third team supposed to represent
9 the United States?

10 A I think there was.

11 Q Now, in addition to the Pearl Harbor Operation,
12 did the games include an elaborate representation of the
13 invasion with carefully worked out schedules for the
14 occupation of Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, the
15 Philippines, the Solomons and the Central Pacific Islands
16 and Hawaii?

17 A I do not think there was any such elaborate
18 plans. Generally, the purpose was to study fleet move-
19 ments and there were nothing included in the games which
20 included landing operations or ground fighting or any
21 particulars of that nature.

22 Q Isn't a landing operation one in which the
23 fleet plays an important part?

24 A Yes, but because of the difficulty -- because
25 it was difficult to umpire anything pertaining to ground

1 fighting and whatever followed -- landing operations
2 and whatever follows that, the study considered these
3 to be unnecessary.

4 Q Was not a carefully worked out schedule for
5 those operations produced during the games?

6 A We were concerned only with operations at the
7 outset of the fighting, that is, up to the point of the
8 landing operations and where such landing operations
9 were to take place. But, after that, we were officers
10 of the navy and had no familiarity with the matter, so
11 we did not consider it necessary to go into such details.

12 Q But, I understand you did go into detail of
13 the naval part of the operations I have mentioned; did
14 you not?

15 A I have no recollection of ever having made
16 any such statements. Let me explain my role at that
17 time. At that time I was one of the umpires for aerial
18 operations and there were a number of umpires, about two
19 or three besides myself.

20 Q Did the aerial operations which you umpired
21 include attack on Pearl Harbor and also attack on any
22 of the places that I have mentioned?

23 A Yes, I definitely umpired the Pearl Harbor
24 Operations, but as to other operations -- I was asked
25 to umpire certain phases of certain operations -- but

1 I do not remember ever having served as umpire for
2 over-all operations.

3 Q But, did those which you did umpire include
4 the aerial attacks on Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East
5 Indies, the Philippines, the Solomons, the Central
6 Pacific Islands, or any of them?

7 A I think I was connected with the Philippine
8 Area operations.

9 Q Now, how long before these games took place
10 had the plans for them been in preparation? I said
11 or should have said "preparation" not "operation."

12 A That, I do not know.

13 Q It must have taken a long time; didn't it?

14 A I do not think so. As a matter of fact, I
15 was merely asked to serve as an umpire in these partic-
16 ular games.

17 Q Now, on --

18 A The plans for the war games themselves were
19 drawn up by the Combined Fleet, and, therefore, I cannot
20 give you -- and, therefore, I am unable to give you
21 a clear answer.

22 Q On what do you base your statement that the
23 games in Tokyo began in the middle of September instead
24 of, as I put it to you, the 2nd of September?

25 A I have no particular basis. I am only speaking

1 to you from my memory.

2 Q Now, I suggest that in the middle of September,
3 namely on the 15th, after they were over, the staff
4 officers went to Iwakuni to report the results of them
5 to army staff officers; is that correct?

6 A That is not so.

7 Q Do you mean that you are in a position to know
8 that that is not so, or merely that you don't know?

9 A I know, and, therefore, I said that is not a
10 fact. To repeat what I would like to say, it is a fact
11 that we assembled on Iwakuni, but it is not a fact
12 that results of the games were reported.

13 Q Did you meet army staff officers at Iwakuni?

14 A Yes, we met army staff officers.

15 Q Who was at the head of them?

16 A I have no recollection.

17 Q And were not the proposed attacks on Pearl
18 Harbor and the other places I have mentioned, discussed
19 at this meeting?

20 A The Pearl Harbor Operations were not discussed
21 at that time.

22 Q What did you talk about?

23 A I have committed a very serious error. I
24 should like to make a correction. The army staff officers
25 that we met at Iwakuni was on November 15th, in the

1 middle of November, and not in the middle of September.

2 MR. COMYNS CARR: That is all I have to ask.

3 (Whereupon, counsel SHIMANOUCHI approached
4 the lectern.) (Through the interpreter) May

5 THE PRESIDENT: What do you propose to do, Mr.
6 SHIMANOUCHI?

7 MR. SHIMANOUCHI: I wish to conduct a redirect
8 examination.

9 THE PRESIDENT: No, Mr. Blewett will do that,
10 if necessary.

11 Mr. Blewett, you will conduct the redirect
12 examination, if necessary. Nothing has come out on
13 cross-examination affecting OSHIMA.

14 MR. SHIMANOUCHI: Mr. President, I should like
15 to conduct a redirect examination of this witness,
16 because he has stated to the effect that a map of Malaya
17 was made in January, 1941.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that has got nothing to
19 do with OSHIMA more particularly. Any counsel could
20 ask the right or claim the right to conduct the re-
21 direct examination if you can.

22 MR. SHIMANOUCHI: I should like to consult
23 counsel Blewett for a short while.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, do so.

25 THE WITNESS: (Speaking in Japanese)

(Mr. Comyns Carr approached the lectern.)

THE PRESIDENT: I have to hear what it is. He might be asking for a drink of water for all I know.

THE WITNESS: (Through the interpreter) May I be permitted to make an explanation with regard to a remark made by counsel SHIMANOUCHI? He seems to be under the impression that I stated that in January, 1941 an aerial reconnaissance was made of Malaya and a map made. I did not make any such statement. I said that an aerial picture was taken. I did not say that a map had been made.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he had no permission to ask any question yet.

Mr. Blewett.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BLEWETT:

Q Captain, was it before or after 6 September that you acted as umpire in these naval maneuvers?

A After.

MR. BLEWETT: That is all, your Honor.

May the witness be excused on the usual terms?

THE PRESIDENT: He is released on the usual terms.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-past

1 one.

2 (Whereupon, at 1207, a recess was taken.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's permission,
the accused ITAGAKI is absent from the court-room,
conferring with his counsel. He will be absent during
the whole of the afternoon.

Mr. Blewett.

MR. BLEWETT: I call the witness HIGASA, Ken.

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1 K E N H I G A S A, called as a witness in behalf
2 of the defense, being first duly sworn, testified
3 through Japanese interpreters as follows:

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION

5 BY MR. BLEWETT:

6 Q Will you please state your name and address?

7 A My name is HIGASA, Ken. My address is
8 No. 124, 2 Chome, Kitazawa, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo.

9 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be shown defense
10 document 1909?

11 (Whereupon, a document was handed to the
12 witness.)

13 Q Will you please state if that is your affi-
14 davit and if you have signed it?

15 A This is my affidavit. It bears my signature.

16 Q Are the contents therein true and correct?

17 A Yes, true and correct.

18 MR. BLEWETT: I offer in evidence defense
19 document 1909.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
21 terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document
23 1909 will receive exhibit No. 3021.

24 (Whereupon, the document above
25 referred to was marked defense exhibit 3021 and

received in evidence.)

1 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 3021.

2 "In the summer of 1941, I was a Lieutenant
3 Colonel in the Japanese Army and occupied the post of
4 staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters.

5 "At the conclusion of the co-defense pact
6 between Japan and French Indo-China, I was despatched
7 by the General Headquarters to aid the spot negotia-
8 tions which were carried out by Major General SUMITA
9 stationed at Hanoi at that time.

10 "Major General SUMITA was informed by the
11 General Headquarters that the diplomatic negotiation
12 regarding the co-defense of Japan and French Indo-
13 China in July, 1941, was concluded in France on 21
14 July, between Mr. Darlan, the then Foreign Minister of
15 the Vichy Government, and Mr. KATO, Sotomatsu, the
16 Japanese Ambassador to France, and that the exchange
17 of official statements was made on 22 July, 1941.
18 At the same time he was informed of the arrangement of
19 military cooperation, the contents of which are identi-
20 cal with that of Exhibit No. 651. Although Exhibit No.
21 651 is dated 29 July, 1941, the contents were reported
22 before this date.

23 "Based upon these informations, Major General
24 SUMITA immediately opened negotiations with French
25

1 Indo-China.

2 "At that time the relation between Japanese
3 party and the party from the French Indo-China Govern-
4 ment Office was very friendly, and always closely
5 connected. As a result, the spot agreement based on
6 the exchanged official statements, of which Major
7 General SUMITA was directly in charge, proceeded
8 smoothly and speedily without any trouble. Together
9 with the Navy and Foreign Office representatives I
10 witnessed the signing between Major General SUMITA
11 Raishiro and Governor-General Decoux. As the repre-
12 sentatives of French Indo-China, there were present the
13 Governor-General, the Chief-Secretary, Juan, and several
14 other persons, and the signing was carried out in a
15 very friendly manner. At the signing, Major General
16 SUMITA asked the French party whether the notifica-
17 tion from France containing the same contents as that
18 of Exhibit No. 651 stated above reached French Indo-
19 China party, and the French party affirmed it.

20 "I recall that the date of this agreement was
21 23 July 1941.

22 "The contents of this agreement were none
23 other than that of enforcing details in compliance
24 with the official statement mentioned above. It is
25 composed of concrete measures in detail, such as the

1 movement of Japanese forces, their landing point and
2 landing date, the course of the troops, occupation
3 regions, the facilities for billeting and supplying
4 of the Japanese forces, the removal of breech mechan-
5 ism from the guns of French Indo-China forces, par-
6 ticularly to avoid the accidental occurrences of
7 collision between Japanese and French Indo-China forces,
8 as is set forth in Article II of the official state-
9 ment, the gist and region of withdrawal of the French
10 Indo-China forces stationed in the vicinity of the
11 beach where Japanese forces plan to land and the
12 establishment of land marks visible from the air at
13 the stationed areas of French Indo-China forces.

14 "Neither the telegram sent from the General
15 Headquarters, nor the agreement documents of that time
16 can be found today."

17 I refer the Tribunal to the certificate which
18 comprises the last page of the document.

19 "I flew by air to 'San-a' in the Hainan Is-
20 land on the day after the conclusion of this agree-
21 ment, and informed the Supreme Commanders of the Jap-
22 anese Army and Navy, who were there as occupation
23 forces, the course up to the conclusion and also of
24 the contents of the agreement. We talked especially
25 about the minute arrangements for the prevention of

accidental collision.

1 "Then, on or about the following day, the
2 25th of July, I remember going to Saigon by air with
3 Major General SUMITA and others. Detailed arrange-
4 ments were made there between French Indo-China forces
5 stationed there and us. Needless to say, the prelim-
6 inary agreements, etc., between Japan and French Indo-
7 China at Saigon were carried out in a friendly atmos-
8 phere throughout these meetings. Scrupulous care and
9 preparations were made lest any accidental collision
10 should occur in the several days prior to the landing
11 of Japanese forces. It was especially planned in
12 advance that the SUMITA Mission shall certify the with-
13 drawal of the French Indo-China forces from the beach,
14 who in turn shall report it to the Japanese forces,
15 and then the landing shall begin. This was executed
16 exactly so. Accordingly, a part of the Japanese forces
17 landed on the 28th, and the greater part on the 29th,
18 and no accident occurred.

20 "I later found in a document (Court Exhibit
21 No. 651) that the date of the formal signing of the
22 protocol regarding the co-defense of French Indo-China
23 was 29 July 1941.

24 "However, as mentioned above, the contents
25 of the official statement exchanged by the representa-

1 tives of both countries on 22 July were reported to
2 each respective despatched agency, by the governments
3 of Japan and France. Based on this, the pact was con-
4 cluded harmoniously and the occupation was begun."

5 May I call the Tribunal's attention to the
6 date at the end of the certificate of source, which
7 is given as March? It is very clear that should be
8 July. I am sure the witness can clarify that if the
9 Court thinks it is necessary. I understand, sir, it
10 was a mistake made by the person who took the affi-
11 davit.

12 THE PRESIDENT: It can be corrected in one way
13 only, by further evidence, unless it is admitted.

14 Mr. Tavenner.

15 MR. TAVENNER: It is obviously a mistake,
16 your Honor, and we accept the correction.

17 MR. BLEWETT: Will you examine the witness?

18 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

19 MR. TAVENNER: If the Tribunal please, we do
20 not desire to cross-examine.

21 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be excused, sir?

22 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused on the usual
23 terms.

24 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

25 MR. BLEWETT: I now offer in evidence defense

1 document 626A-10, which is a portion of the interroga-
2 tion of General TOJO of 13 February, not read by the
3 prosecution but which is necessary to understand the
4 true situation. The portion that was read by Mr. Fihelly
5 is exhibit 1123, on page 10,180 of the record.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 626A-10
8 will receive exhibit No. 3022.

9 (Whereupon, the document above referred
10 to was marked defense exhibit 3022 and received
11 in evidence.)

12 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 3022.

13 "13 February 1946.

14 "Q That measures were to be taken in connec-
15 tion with advancing southward?

16 "A I think perhaps they were the dispatch
17 of troops into southern Indo-China.

18 "Q That other measures were taken in connec-
19 tion with advancing southward?

20 "A I think that was all.

21 "Q Was anything to be done in connection
22 with Thailand?

23 "A I rather think so - in connection with
24 increasing close relations with that country. Previous
25 to this time, on 9 May 1941, Japan had arbitrated the

border dispute between Thai and French Indo-China.

1 "Q Was it not planned to occupy French Indo-
2 China?

3 "A Not at all. Japan concluded a joint
4 defence treaty for the stabilization of French Indo-
5 China on 29 July, 1941.

6 "Q Prior to that time, had any Japanese
7 troops entered French Indo-China?"

8
9 Apparently, your Honor, this means south Indo-
10 China, which will be later cleared up.

11 "A No, they had not. They were dispatched
12 in accordance with the treaty. The treaty was signed
13 on 29 July 1941 and the troops were dispatched to
14 southern Indo-China on the same day. They entered the
15 country on a basis of the agreement.

16 "Q Prior to the treaty in question, had it
17 not been decided in July 1941 to send troops to that
18 country whether French Indo-China agreed or not?

19 "A Not at all. A military agreement had
20 been concluded on September 22, 1940, under which the
21 Japanese troops were stationed in northern French Indo-
22 China. The situation was that military pressure from
23 Singapore, the Philippines, and so forth, had continued
24 and, on 25 July 1941, the American freezing of assets
25 had gone into effect and it had become very difficult

1 to carry on peaceful commerce with the Dutch Indies.
2 The China Incident was continuing and the stabiliza-
3 tion of French Indo-China was a very important matter.
4 Therefore, on 29 July, troops were sent to the southern
5 part of Indo-China in accordance with the agreement.
6 The Imperial Conference had foreseen changes in the
7 situation and had decided to carry on negotiations with
8 France in reference to Indo-China.

9 * * * *

1 "Q. Was not the real reason why Japan decided
2 in July 1941 to advance southward that she needed raw
3 materials?

4 "A This was certainly not the main reason. The
5 main reason was the necessity for maintaining stabil-
6 ity in French Indo-China while the fighting with China
7 was going on, but Japan did need peaceful trade in order
8 to support production at home as well as to maintain
9 the struggle in China. America had stopped trade
10 with Japan and Japan needed oil, iron ore, bauxite,
11 tin, and food from the south, to be gained by peace-
12 ful trade."

13 * * * *

14 "Q. What was there about the stability of Indo-China
15 that necessitated calling an Imperial Conference in
16 July 1941?

17 "A. The China Incident was in progress and Japan
18 was exerting every effort to successfully conclude it.
19 Any disturbed area to the south would have an unfavor-
20 able effect on the solution of the incident. Moreover,
21 it had been a Japanese idea for a very long time before
22 this to maintain the stability of East Asia. A third
23 reason is that foodstuffs, principally rice, which were
24 imported from French Indo-China, would be unavailable if
25 conditions were unsettled in French Indo-China. These

foodstuffs were very necessary for Japan.

1 "Q. Was it considered by you, as War Minister,
2 that French Indo-China would be militarily useful in
3 connection with the China Incident?

4 "A. Of course, I thought of it. Of course, from
5 the military point of view, there was a practical rela-
6 tion as far as northern French Indo-China was concerned.
7 The supply route north from French Indo-China was of
8 assistance to the Chinese and, furthermore, we wanted,
9 from the military point of view, to establish air bases
10 in northern French Indo-China so as to be able to cut
11 off the route from Burma. However, the fact that French
12 power had declined, as a result of conditions in Europe,
13 necessitated the stationing of troops not only in
14 northern Indo-China but also in the central and
15 southern parts for the maintenance of stability."
16

17 * * * *

18 "Q. You have mentioned that the presence of
19 Japanese troops in French Indo-China was of assistance
20 in the fighting against the Chinese. Would not the pres-
21 ence of troops in French Indo-China also be of assist-
22 ance to Japan in case war should break out between
23 Japan and England, America, or Holland?

24 "A. Economic and military pressure from Eng-
25 land, America and Holland was increasing. The station-

1 ing of troops in Indo-China was chiefly to maintain the
2 stability of that country. However, it did assist oper-
3 ations against China and help make peaceful commerce
4 possible. The stationing of troops there was for de-
5 fensive military protection and was an appropriate
6 measure of national defense, I believe."

7 * * * *

8 We call the attention of the Tribunal to Pros-
9 ecution Exhibit No. 809 which seems to have been relied
10 upon to a great extent in proving military preparations.

11 From Page 9011 of the Record I read this por-
12 tion of that Exhibit to indicate the date on which
13 these preparations took place:

14 "Available references documenting these prep-
15 arations are as yet fragmentary, especially in respect
16 to specialized training operations in tropical warfare
17 reputed to have taken place throughout the summer and
18 fall of 1941. As the date of the opening of hostilit-
19 ies is approached, however, pertinent references grow
20 more plentiful, until for the month of November 1941 it
21 is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive
22 picture of Japanese military preparations."

23 It is also respectfully submitted that accord-
24 ing to the same Exhibit No. 809 no general mobiliza-
25 tion of the military took place in Japan until October

1941.

Reference is also made to page 9050 of the Record, a quotation from the same Exhibit, regarding so-called land operation practice; this comment is made: "Little, if any, military advantage resulted from those operations, and it would now appear that they had been intended solely for training....."

I call the witness, NISHIMURA, Susumu.

the witness.

Q Is that your affidavit?

A Yes.

Q Are the contents true and correct?

A Yes.

MR. BIRNEY: I offer in evidence defense document 1090.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1090 will receive defense exhibit number 1023.

MR. BIRNEY: I shall read the Exhibit 1023.

"I. I was serving in the business concerning the military preparations in the Military Affairs Section, the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry, from October 1931 to August 1941, except the period from April 1934 to February 1937 during which I was residing

1 S U S U M U N I S H I U R A, called as a witness in
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BLEWETT:

Q Will you please state your name and address?

6 A My name is NISHIURA, Susuma. My address is
7 No. 560, Ome-Cho, Nishi Tama Gun, Tokyo.

MR. BLEWETT: May witness be handed document 1690?

9 (Whereupon, a document is shown to
10 the witness.)

Q Is that your affidavit?

A Yes.

Q Are the contents true and correct?

A Yes.

15 MR. BLEWETT: I offer in evidence defense docu-
16 ment 1690.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1690 will
19 receive defense exhibit number 3023.

MR. BLEWETT: I shall read the Exhibit 3023.

21 "1. I was serving in the business concerning
22 the military preparations in the Military Affairs Sec-
23 tion, the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry,
24 from October 1931 to August 1941, except the period from
25 April 1934 to February 1937 during which I was residing

1 abroad. From August 10, 1941 I was ill and in hospital
2 over a month, and could not work in the office during the
3 period of illness. Was transferred to the post of the
4 Private Secretary to the War Minister in October of the
5 same year, returned to the Military Service Bureau again
6 in April 1942 as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section.
7 Since then until December 1944, I was serving in the
8 business of the same section.

9 "2. First of all, I will speak about the fact
10 that most of the armaments used in the Pacific War was
11 spared or supplied from the military provisions either
12 which had been originally prepared to be used in Man-
13 churia for guarding Manchuria against USSR, or which had
14 been prepared as an emergency in the process of the Sino-
15 Japanese Incident. And it had not been originally pre-
16 pared to be used in a Pacific War. In the Mobilization
17 Plan of 1941 which had been planned by March of 1941,
18 the organization of the units in operations was as
19 follows:

20 "(a) Having a large Baggage Transport Section
21 in the rear providing against the fighting in severely
22 cold or barren regions.

23 "(b) The whole organization of the brigade was
24 equipped so as to be the Mobile Units in operations in
25 Manchuria but under no consideration to be used in the

1 Southern Islands.

2 "(c) All the horses needed in the Supply and
3 Baggage Departments were to be Manchurian horses except
4 the horses for the Headquarters (which was one-third
5 of the entire number).

6 "These points are worth notice. Consequently,
7 immediately before using these units in the Southern
8 Regions, we had to change the organization completely
9 to make it suitable for the purpose. And even though
10 the organization had been changed, yet it could not be
11 but a very unadjusted inadequate and incomplete one,
12 when the unit was mobilized to the South. You can
13 surmise the Operation Plan by the distribution of the
14 Supplies for Operation. Noting, for example, the dis-
15 tribution of ammunitions and aviation gasolines in the
16 supplies for operations under the direct control of
17 General Headquarters about the spring of 1941:
18

19 Ammunitions

20 In Manchuria	20%
21 In China Republic	30%
22 In Japan Proper	50%
23 In Formosa & French India	none

24 Aviation Gasolines

25 In Manchuria	16%
In China Republic	4%
In Japan Proper	80%
In Formosa & French India	none

Moreover, by the so-called 'Seki Special Manoeuvres' "
(which I am told, your Honor, means Quantung Army Spec-

1 ial Manoeuvres) "which aimed at the strengthening of
2 the guarding of the USSR Manchuria Boundaries, they
3 began to send forth a considerable portion of the
4 supplies necessary for the operation which had been
5 preserved within Japan to Manchuria from July or Aug-
6 ust 1941.

7 "27% of the whole ammunitions and 14% of the
8 whole amount of aviation gasolines were removed to
9 Manchuria.

10 "3. With the decision on National Policy
11 early in September 1941, it was scheduled to make
12 preparation for war by the end of October or there-
13 abouts although we were working for a compromise with
14 America through diplomatic negotiation and were decided
15 not to resort to war with America and Britain except in
16 unavoidable circumstances. But at least in the field
17 of supplies Japan was already blocked entirely by
18 America and England, and there was no room for an
19 increase in output, and what was referred to as a com-
20 pletion of military preparation for the war against
21 America and England was in reality a mere changing of
22 the distribution of the supplies which were already po-
23 ssessed by Japan, or preparation of personnel and mater-
24 ials for developing resources in the Southern Region in
25 case of an outbreak of operations in the South, and Japan

1 was obliged to be content with this.

2 "As for the supplies for operation mentioned
3 above, for the first time, in the period from September
4 1941 to December, 10% of the ammunition and 12% of the
5 aviation gasoline were transferred to Formosa and French
6 India.

7 "4. As a supplementary explanation, I will give
8 the details of the completion of military preparation for
9 about ten years preceding the Pacific War.

10 "In September 1931, the Manchurian Affair broke
11 out. The Japanese Army at that time basically consisted
12 of over 17 Divisions and 26 Air Squadrons. (Ex. 880) How-
13 ever, although the numerical strength of the Front seems
14 to have been arranged, material to equip them was badly
15 wanting, and even the ammunition allotted to each Brigade
16 on its mobilization was hardly sufficient.

17 "Though it had been decided to produce these
18 munitions by mobilizing all the industrial power of Japan
19 evidently it was only a paper plan and there were many
20 parts that could not be taken seriously. But as we had
21 no concrete remedy for them, we did nothing about that.
22 As for the productive power of aeroplanes and the stor-
23 age of aviation gasolines, they were almost none, and
24 the real substance of the Imperial Army, which was com-
25 monly acknowledged to be the strongest army power in the

1 East Asia, was a mere superficial armament that had
2 no content. The amount of consumption of steel in one
3 year by the army at that time was only 20 thousand tons,
4 and the total budget was only about ¥ 200,000,000. Thus
5 being under the restriction of state economy, in spite
6 of the anxiety of the authorities concerned with the
7 military preparations, not only were the preparations
8 of the Japanese Army inferior when compared with those
9 of the other powers, which after participating in the
10 First World War showed a marked advance in their arma-
11 ments, but they were also substantially getting poorer
12 and poorer. Munitions and other materials produced were
13 merely sufficient to supply the peace time consumption.
14 In such a condition of the military preparation, the
15 Manchurian Affair broke out. However, Japan had prom-
16 ised a cooperative defense with Manchuhuo, while on the
17 other hand had to consider the defense of that part of
18 Manchuria which bordered with the great military power
19 of USSR. In addition, she had to face the continued
20 advancement of industries of the USSR, and her increase
21 of the numerical strength in the Eastern Part of 'Siberia'.
22 All of these necessitated Japan to increase her military
23 power in Manchuria in order to feel secure in the north-
24 ern region of Manchuria.
25

"But in reality, the economical restriction was

1 as strict as ever and the military power in Manchuria
2 was increased only slightly year by year. For instance,
3 aviation which needed the most urgent progress, the
4 annual amount of production was only about 100 million
5 yen in reality, and the entire Army air unit, which
6 consisted of 26 companies in 1931, was barely increased
7 to 50 some odd companies in 1936. Moreover, the make-up
8 of these companies was so poor that no one thought it
9 possible to carry out offensive operations.

10 "In the General Staff Office, they considered
11 that if something should arise between Japan and the
12 USSR, the defense of Japan and Manchuria would be im-
13 possible unless Japan had at least as many as two-
14 thirds of the military strength anticipated to be used
15 in East Asia by the USSR. However, in actuality such
16 strength could never be provided.

17 "So, it was a matter of course that no one
18 had ever thought of preparing for an all-out war with
19 China, if such did ensue. Up to the happening of the
20 Lukouchiao Incident in 1937, there had never been any
21 request from the General Staff Office concerning the
22 filling up of the armaments with a view to such an
23 incident. The idea behind the desire to complete the
24 armaments in those days was mainly to be prepared to
25 take counter-measure if and when attacked by the USSR.

1 It was planned, with the idea that benzine and other
2 necessary war materials which were lacking in Japan and
3 Manchuria, could be obtained from the United States and
4 Britain and even from China. Fighting against China,
5 Britain and the United States was never contemplated.

6 "5. In the spring of 1937 when I came back
7 to Japan from European duty to serve in the Military
8 Affairs Office, they were just beginning to realize the
9 above plan to complete the armaments - the plan which
10 was being made intently since 1936 in the way of defense
11 against the USSR. On the other hand they were having
12 much discussion about the plan to expand the product-
13 ive power of Japanese and Manchurian with the objective
14 of developing industrial economy of the two nations.
15 When we checked the military demand with this plan,
16 the self-sufficiency of fuels in the event of war with
17 USSR, for instance, would be impossible in Japan and
18 Manchuria even if the plan was carried out accordingly.

19 Furthermore, we had never in peace time considered
20 stocking the quantity necessary for war time. So the
21 plan was being carried out with the idea of keeping
22 friendly relations with America, England and China,
23 etc., even if a war should break out against the USSR.

24 "6. In such a situation as explained above,
25 suddenly the Lukouchiao Affair broke out in July 1937.

1 The affair spread more and more in spite of the Japan-
2 ese policy and effort to minimize it. The develop-
3 ment of the hostile situation gradually made it necessary
4 to mobilize and send to China a Group, which had not been
5 expected necessary. Even the budget for the expedition
6 was barely appropriated in 3 piecemeal amounts during
7 the summer and fall of 1937.

8 "And a considerable quantity of the materials
9 which had been accumulated with a great deal of trouble
10 in preparation to defend against the USSR was consumed
11 against China. Moreover, the divisions which were
12 expected to be used in Manchuria had been used in China,
13 and in many cases their organizations and equipment
14 were not suitable for the local situation and we suffer-
15 ed greatly. For instance, though the use of field guns
16 was inconvenient and mountain guns were more expedient
17 in China, most of the Japanese divisions were Field
18 Artillery divisions. Therefore we had to reorganize
19 them with old-fashioned mountain guns. Moreover,
20 the consumption on the battlefield far exceeded the
21 amount that could be produced. The mobilization of war
22 industries was not as effective as desired since it had
23 just then begun. The unexpected large-scale operation in
24 China consumed a large amount of war materials on the one
25 hand, and increased the danger in the northern region of
Manchuria.

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1 "7. Especially the occurrences of the
2 Changkufeng affair in the summer of 1938 and of the
3 Nomonhan affair in 1939 gave us a lesson and a chance
4 to reconsider our military preparations.

5 "The lack of our munitions in the Changkufeng
6 affair made us realize the fact that we were capable of
7 supplying only seven and a half divisions in the event
8 the affair spreads. In the Nomonhan affair our capacity
9 of supplying air and mechanized units was inferior when
10 compared with the efficiency of supply of the mighty
11 air and mechanized units of the USSR. These facts made
12 us feel that unless we put our entire efforts in military
13 preparation against the USSR it was not possible even
14 to carry out the China affair with confidence. On the
15 other hand, as it became evident that the Sino-Japanese
16 affair was going to be prolonged in spite of Japan's
17 desire to settle the affair early, to supply the China
18 theater of war and to increase the security against the
19 North, the drafting of a plan was undertaken in 1939
20 and the idea conceived was to strengthen the army war
21 supply mobilization for 3 years beginning in 1941. The
22 total budget for the plan was about 100 billion yen,
23 and 40% of it was to be appropriated for supplies in
24 China and the rest was for military preparation in
25 Manchuria. Also the transfer of a munitions industry

1 to Manchuria was tried as much as possible in considera-
2 tion of war against the Soviet, and it was decided to
3 establish the South Manchuria Plant etc., in Mukden
4 and in other places. The immediate completion of
5 military preparations being so urgently demanded at
6 that time that the ordnance manufacturing was consider-
7 ably advanced but the cultivation of the resources
8 which was the basis of the manufacturing industries
9 was much neglected. Especially, liquid fuel, 'rubber',
10 bauxite and alloys of special steel among the war
11 materials of Japan had to be obtained more than ever
12 from abroad, that is America and England due to the
13 expansion of necessary wartime strength and the con-
14 sequent need of these materials. That is, the material
15 support by America and England which had been considered
16 to be absolutely necessary in case of war with the
17 Soviet in future, became much more vital. The army of
18 that time, bearing even this serious burden, went ahead
19 to draft the Three-Year Plan.

20 "8. As the Sino-Japanese affair progressed
21 it gradually brought about the anti-Japanese economical
22 oppression of America, England and other countries.
23 The situation became critically worse after the summer
24 of 1940. However, if the relations with America and
25 England should be broken, the Japanese army would be

1 frustrated in carrying out the Sino-Japanese affair
2 as explained above, and besides, it would also mean
3 the upsetting of the foundation of completing military
4 preparations for the defense of Manchuria in view of
5 the frequent armed conflicts actually occurring along
6 the Soviet-Manchuria borders. Also as we had never
7 thought of warring against America and England, we
8 believed we would somehow be able to come through this
9 crisis. We were just unable to change our point of
10 view and engage in military preparations for war
11 against America and England.

12 "In fact, the public opinion was anti-
13 America and anti-English and it would have been natural
14 for the military authorities to prepare for an emer-
15 gency because such is their duty.

16 "But they had a set traditional idea of
17 defense against the USSR and anybody who knew anything
18 about the material situation in the event of war with
19 America and England were fully aware of the difficul-
20 ties that would confront Japan in the course of such
21 war. These facts prevented them from making whole-
22 hearted preparations. For the Japanese army at that
23 time the solution of the China affair and the military
24 preparation for the defense against the USSR were more
25 than they could handle. Even if full military

1 preparation for war with America and England was
2 ordered by their superiors they would not have been
3 able to do so concretely due to the lack of materials
4 and the budget.

5 "Since the middle of 1941, the situation grew
6 worse day by day. In the Japanese army, the consensus
7 of opinion was to accelerate to reach an agreement
8 through diplomatic negotiations and avoid the dangerous
9 situation. And thus, the summer of 1941 came as
10 mentioned above."

11 If your Honor please, I offer in evidence
12 defense document No. 2099 to show the table of mater-
13 ials prepared for operations with a view to asking
14 this witness one or two questions about it.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2099
17 will receive exhibit No. 3024.)

18 (Whereupon, the document above
19 referred to was marked defense exhibit
20 No. 3024 but not received in evidence.)

21 MR. BLEWETT: May exhibit 3024 be shown to
22 the witness, please?

23 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the Tribunal--

24 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

25 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: It had been proposed to

1 point out to the Tribunal that rule 6-b(1) has not
2 been complied with in respect to this document and
3 the prosecution has had no opportunity of considering
4 it properly. We submit that the document should not
5 be accepted at this stage.

6 THE PRESIDENT: After it was tendered I
7 paused for several seconds before admitting it;
8 however, the rule must be complied with.

9 MR. BLEWETT: I think the Brigadier is under
10 misapprehension here. The certificate only refers to
11 one sheet; the original Japanese is only one sheet.
12 He feels that, and maybe justifiably so, it was taken
13 from some book but I have no knowledge of whether it
14 was or not. This is the way it was handed to me, just
15 one sheet, and a certificate referring to one sheet.
16 This is not an excerpt, sir. I notice that it does
17 say "excerpt" there but this is the ordinary form
18 that they use in referring to excerpts and that should
19 really mean "authorized copy."

20 THE PRESIDENT: The certificate says it is
21 an "exact and authorized excerpt from an official
22 document".

23 MR. BLEWETT: That is a mistake, sir, as I
24 tried to point out. This certificate of authenticity
25 has been made up and is used in the regular form. Now,

1 this is just one single document and it is not an
2 excerpt from any book or publication and was processed
3 in the regular way as any other type of document.

4 THE PRESIDENT: The defense are insisting
5 upon their objection which must be sustained -- the
6 prosecution, rather.

7 MR. BLEWETT: You said the defense, sir;
8 is that--

9 THE PRESIDENT: Prosecution.

10 Brigadier Quilliam.

11 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the
12 Tribunal, we accept Mr. Blewett's assurance that this
13 is not an excerpt. We were deceived by the form of
14 certificate.

15 We had intended, not realizing that it was
16 going to be put in through this witness, to object
17 to the document as being immaterial and irrelevant
18 on its face but I assume--

19 THE PRESIDENT: I am sure it will not help
20 in the least. We all know, we all have some ideas
21 of what supplies are necessary to keep an army going.

22 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: Apparently the Tribunal
23 is expected to know how much supplies are needed for
24 two days, two battles, and matters of that kind.

25 We submit that on the face of it this document

1 is most unhelpful and, as I say, we object to its
2 admission on that ground.

3 THE PRESIDENT: There is too much detail.

4 MR. BLEWETT: It was only our purpose to refer
5 to certain portions of it, your Honor. The most
6 important feature of this document and the purpose
7 for its submission is the date on which this operation
8 was to take effect -- December, end of December.

9 THE PRESIDENT: By a majority the Court
10 sustains the objection and rejects the document.

11 MR. BLEWETT: You may cross-examine the
12 witness.

13 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the
14 Tribunal, we do not wish to cross-examine.

15 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be excused on
16 the usual terms.

17 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

18 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

19 MR. BLEWETT: I call the witness YOSHINAGA,
20 Yoshitaka.

21 Your Honor, what disposition will be made of
22 the document that was admitted and then rejected?

23 THE PRESIDENT: As I observed, the prosecution
24 were very slow in making their objection. I admitted
25 it after a pause but before a number was called they

1 did object.

2 MR. BLEWETT: Sir, it was given No. 3024
3 and I presume the Clerk will have to make a note of
4 that.

5 THE PRESIDENT: No, the number that was on
6 that document on the assumption that it would be
7 admitted finally will be the number of the next
8 document.

9 - - -

10 Y O S H I T A K A Y O S H I N A G A, called as a
11 witness on behalf of the defense, being first
12 duly sworn, testified through Japanese inter-
13 preters as follows:

14 DIRECT EXAMINATION

15 BY MR. BLEWETT:

16 Q Will you please state your name and address?

17 A My name is YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka; my address
18 is: No. 226 Unogi-cho, Chofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo.

19 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be handed
20 defense document No. 2105.

21 Q Is that your affidavit and did you sign it?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Are the contents true and correct?

24 A Yes.

25 MR. BLEWETT: I offer in evidence defense

1 document No. 2105.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document
4 No. 2105 will receive exhibit No. 3024.

5 (Whereupon, the document above
6 referred to was marked defense exhibit
7 No. 3024 and was received in evidence.)

8 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit No. 3024:
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1 "I was commissioned as Army Artillery 2nd
2 Lieutenant in 1926, and was engaged in the ordnance
3 research work of various nations at the Army
4 Technical Headquarters from 1932 to 1934. From
5 1936 to the end of war, I was engaged in the
6 planning of research and in the ordnance research
7 of various nations at the Army Technical Headquarters
8 (later the Technical Department, Army Ordnance
9 Administrative Headquarters).

10 "The study of ordnance technique in the Army
11 was made exclusively with consideration for cold-
12 region operations in line with the Anti-Soviet
13 operations. It was after the stationing of troops
14 in Southern French Indo-China that the Southern
15 operation, that is, the tropical-zone operation
16 was taken into consideration.

17 "The fundamental policy of the ordnance re-
18 search work was directed by the War Minister in 1937
19 or so, and this policy remained unchanged until
20 1943. Nothing was indicated in this policy to give
21 consideration to operations in the Southern area.

22 "Consequently, the importance has been
23 attached to the adaptability of weapons in the cold
24 zone. The principal weapons were tried in the cold-
25 zones in North Manchuria every year since 1932 or

1 so, and those weapons which did not pass the tests
2 were not adopted as regular weapons. However, the
3 adaptability in the tropical zone was never taken
4 into consideration.

5 "After the stationing of troops in Southern
6 French Indo-China, it was emphasized that the
7 adaptability of weapons in the tropical zone be
8 also considered in the research work, and the
9 ordnance technicians were sent to Formosa in August,
10 1941, to test various weapons.

11 "A tropical zone test room for weapons was
12 completed for the first time towards the end of
13 October, 1941.

14 "Thus, the war broke out when the research
15 work regarding the adaptability of weapons in the
16 tropical zone was in its early stage and incomplete.

17 "As a result, the defects of the various
18 kinds of weapons became apparent in the Southern
19 theater of war.

20 "For example, there was a tremendous amount
21 of unusable ammunition due to the insufficient damp-
22 proof device, and the local units preferred to use
23 captured weapons.

24 "The tanks also had no cooling system, and
25 the research in this line was made only after the war

1 broke out. With regard to railroad, the research
2 had been made as to the various gauges in the Con-
3 tinent, but as to those in the southern regions
4 nothing was done. For the first time in May, 1942
5 the study of railroads in the South was initiated.

6 "Since no training was given to the units
7 in handling weapons in the tropics, a part of the
8 units were given a very short unit-to-unit training
9 since around November 1941."

1 Any questions?

2 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Qu lliam.

3 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: If it please your Honor,
4 we do not wish to cross-examine.

5 MR. BLEWETT: I respectfully refer the
6 Tribunal to exhibit No. 2767 --

7 THE PRESIDENT: Do you want this witness
8 any further?

9 MR. BLEWETT: I am sorry, your Honor.

10 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused on the usual
11 terms.

12 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

13 MR. BLEWETT: I refer the Tribunal to
14 exhibit No. 2767, the affidavit of defense witness
15 OKADA who testified here on 4 and 5 August 1947,
16 page 24,853 to 24,900 of the record, that Japan was
17 not prepared, from a shipping and oil standpoint,
18 for war against the United States and Great Britain.

19 I call the witness YOSHIDA, Tosuke.
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1 T O S U K E Y O S H I D A, called as a witness on
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as
4 follows:

5 DIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. BLEWETT:

7 Q Will you please state your name and address?

8 A My name is YOSHIDA, Tosuke; my address,
9 No. 1 Shin Kawasaki-machi, Kita-ku, Osaka.

10 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be handed
11 defense document No. 1710?

12 Q Is that your affidavit, Mr. YOSHIDA?

13 A Yes. I should like to make a change. In
14 here it says that I am at present Director of
15 Customs of Kobe, but since then I have been trans-
16 ferred and I am now chief of the Financial Bureau
17 of Osaka.

18 Q With that change, are the contents true and
19 correct?

20 A Yes.

21 MR. BLEWETT: I offer in evidence defense
22 document No. 1710.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1710
25 will receive exhibit No. 3025.

1 (Whereupon, the document above
2 referred to was marked defense exhibit
3 No. 3025 and received in evidence.)

4 MR. BLEWETT: I read exhibit 3025:

5 "1). I, YOSHIDA, Tosuke, graduated from
6 the Law Department, Tokyo Imperial University in
7 1926, and immediately entered the Finance Ministry.
8 I was Chief, Treasury Section, Finance Bureau,
9 Finance Ministry, from January, 1941 through October,
10 1942. Therefore, I have full knowledge of the pro-
11 cedure concerning military notes. At present, I am
12 the Director of the Kobe Custom House.

13 "2). Military notes were for the use of the
14 armed forces while in military operations, and in no
15 way belong to the ordinary currency, but, in view of
16 their bearing upon the obligations of the national
17 Treasury, their handling had been placed under the
18 jurisdiction of the Treasury Section of the Finance
19 Bureau of the Finance Ministry, so far as the matters
20 concerned were internal, and except when handled by
21 the military itself.

22 "3). In January, 1941, the Army requested
23 the Finance Ministry to take steps for printing and
24 manufacturing military notes with denominations in
25 foreign currencies of the Southern Regions. Whereupon,

1 in the same month, a Finance Ministry decision on
2 the preparation for the issuance of military notes
3 with foreign currency denominations was made, and a
4 printing and manufacturing order was placed with the
5 Printing Office, a Government organ under the direct
6 supervision of the Cabinet. Around May of the same
7 year, a certain of the said military notes had been
8 printed and manufactured. Printing and production
9 of same was also continued thereafter.

10 "4). About the middle of October of the
11 same year, the Army requested the Finance Ministry
12 to take necessary measures for dealing with said
13 military notes. We, the staff of the Finance Ministry,
14 were working on the draft measures relating thereto.
15 In the meantime a Cabinet change took place on 18
16 October 1941, with Mr. Okinori KAYA as the new
17 Finance Minister.

18 "On 22 October, we completed the drafting
19 of a document entitled 'the issuance of military
20 notes with foreign currency denominations,' which was
21 to be submitted for approval to the Ministers con-
22 cerned. The draft was passed upon by the respective
23 Bureaus concerned in the Finance Ministry and went
24 to Mr. KAYA, the new Minister.
25

"Mr. KAYA showed deep concern about the

1 passage in the summarized particulars relative to
2 the issuance of the military notes with foreign
3 currency denominations in the said draft that reads:
4 'military notes with foreign currency denominations
5 shall be issued, preparing for the eventuality of
6 our taking military operations in South Seas Regions,
7 when they shall be used by the armed forces con-
8 cerned, in their payment of military expenditures.'

9 "He warned maybe, this passage is not
10 erroneous, but it is inadequate to fully express
11 what the drafting authorities are intending. The
12 Army requests that the military notes prepared be-
13 forehand, probably because it fears that exigencies
14 cannot be met by setting about the business in a
15 hurry, just when the hostilities have begun. But
16 our country has by no means decided to wage any war.
17 The meaning of drafting this document, therefore,
18 shall be that we want to be provided with measures
19 relating to military notes, in advance, just as a
20 sort of general preparedness to cope with an un-
21 expected eventuality. The document shall make clear
22 the above-said purport and record what is truly
23 meant by the drafters.

24 "Upon this, the Ministry, on 29 October made
25 out and decided upon a document recording the import

1 of Minister KAYA's remark, and annexed it as a
2 reference to the end of the above-mentioned docu-
3 ment for approval, entitled, 'the issuance of mili-
4 tary notes with foreign currency denomination.'
5 This was sent round to and approved by the respec-
6 tive Ministers concerned. After being thus approved,
7 the document including the said reference was kept
8 in the Treasury Section, where I worked.

9 "5). The 'issuance' of military notes, as
10 mentioned in the aforesaid document, means the
11 crediting by the Bank of Japan to the 'other Govern-
12 ment deposit' at the Bank, of the amount of military
13 notes manufactured by the Cabinet Printing Office
14 and received by the Bank from the said Office."

15 We offer in evidence defense document No.
16 1711, which refers to the issuance of military
17 currency for use in the Southern Areas.

18 When the evidence relating to this question
19 was offered by the prosecution, this document was
20 omitted. It shows, we submit, that no order for the
21 actual use of military currency was made but for an
22 unexpected emergency in the future, and this document
23 is dated 29 October 1941.

24 On page 8652 of the record, I brought this
25 document to the attention of the witness Liebert in

1 connection with prosecution exhibit 852, but he had
2 never heard of it.

3 I call the attention of the Tribunal to the
4 certificate attached.

5 THE PRESIDENT: What about the witness?

6 MR. BLEWETT: I wanted him -- he referred
7 to this question.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

9 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the
10 Tribunal, this matter was referred to, as my friend
11 has said, in the cross-examination of Liebert. The
12 witness said that he had never seen this document or
13 heard of it. A thorough search was made among the
14 prosecution documents at the time, but we were un-
15 able to trace it. At our request the Tribunal gave
16 directions that a thorough search be made by the
17 defense for the document.

18 That took place in October 1946. The next
19 we hear about the matter is a few days ago when we
20 get this certificate.

21 I was surprised to hear my friend, Mr.
22 Blewett, say that we had omitted to put this document
23 in, in view of the fact that we had explained we
24 did not know of it. I am also surprised that he
25 should permit this certificate to go in with the

1 statement in the last sentence, expressed in the
2 vaguest language, stating that the prosecution had
3 had the document but had returned it in 1947, after
4 this incident took place.

5 We do not object to the admission of the
6 document, sir, but I felt it proper to make that
7 explanation and to explain to the Tribunal that we
8 are, for our own satisfaction, endeavoring to clear
9 up why this statement appearing in the certificate
10 should be made.

11 THE PRESIDENT: It certainly is very vague
12 as to the exact time at which it was given to the
13 prosecution's offices and returned by them.

14 MR. BLEWETT: I am offering this, sir, as
15 the witness referred to it in his affidavit, and I am
16 going to ask him if he recognizes it and if that is
17 the one he refers to.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
19 terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1711
21 will receive exhibit No. 3026.

22 (Whereupon, the document above
23 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.
24 3026 and received in evidence.)

25 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445 a recess was
taken until 1500, after which the proceed-
ings were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be shown
4 exhibit 3026, please.

5 If your Honor please, I am informed that
6 Mr. Comyns Carr has the exhibit and that it has been
7 sent for.

8 THE PRESIDENT: What do you want the witness
9 to do in respect of this exhibit?

10 MR. BLEWETT: Just identify it, sir.

11 THE PRESIDENT: But it is already admitted.

12 MR. BLEWETT: All right. Have you any
13 questions for the witness? 26,979

14 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

15 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I assumed, your Honor,
16 that the document would be read as it has been pro-
17 duced in the course of this witness' evidence. But
18 Mr. Blewett says he proposes to read it later.

19 THE PRESIDENT: As far as we are concerned
20 he need never read it. I think we know enough about
21 it.
22

23 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: We do not propose to
24 cross-examine the witness, sir, but I should like to
25 draw the attention of the Tribunal to the references
to the prosecution's evidence on this subject.

MR. BLEWETT: All right. Have you any
questions for the witness? 26,979

1 I refer to exhibit 852, communications 9 and
2 10, pages 8445 to 8469 of the transcript.

3 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be excused, sir?

4 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused on the usual
5 terms.

6 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

7 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 3026.

8 "The issuance of military notes with foreign
9 currency denominations for the use in the Southern
10 Area military operations.

11 "In view of the present international situations
12 and if in case when war plans in the Southern Area are
13 made for an unexpected eventuality in the future; and
14 considering a necessity which may arise in that con-
15 tingency, the issuance of military notes in foreign
16 denomination shall be made as preparatory measures in
17 order to provide for payment of military expenditures
18 of the unit concerned according to the following
19 general outlines.

20
21 "Note: The issuance of military notes in the
22 past were decided upon by the cabinet conference, due
23 to the fact that they were issued just at the time of
24 their actual use. The present issuance, however, being
25 a mere preparatory measure conceived for an unexpected
eventuality in the future, is decided upon by the

1 ministers concerned only, pending report to the cabinet
2 conference if by any chance an emergency truly happens
3 to necessitate their actual use.

4 "1. Military notes with foreign currency
5 denominations shall be issued, preparing for an even-
6 tuality of our military operation in the South Seas
7 Regions, when they shall be used by the armed forces
8 concerned, in their payment of military expenditures.

9 "2. When necessary, the military notes shall
10 be converted into Japanese currency.

11 "3. The handling procedures relative to the
12 above two paragraphs shall be established by the
13 Minister of Finance, upon consultation with the
14 Ministers of War and Navy."

15 I call the witness TANAKA, Shinichi.

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1 S H I N I C H I T A N A K A, recalled as a witness
2 on behalf of the defense, having been pre-
3 viously sworn, testified through Japanese
4 interpreters as follows:

5 THE PRESIDENT: You are still on oath.

6 DIRECT EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. BLEWETT:

8 Q May the witness be shown document 1661, please.
9 Is that your affidavit, General?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Are the contents therein true and correct?

12 A Yes.

13 MR. BLEWETT: I offer in evidence defense
14 document No. 1661.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

16 MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal, I
17 trust that the Members of the Tribunal have had the
18 opportunity of reviewing this document if it was
19 served for the period of three days under the rules.

20 We view it as grossly excessive in length
21 and that argument extends throughout nearly every
22 paragraph. I think our objection to it could only
23 be founded on the ground of prolixity; on the ground
24 also of argument and the expression of opinions and
25 conclusions.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

2 MR. BLEWETT: Well, sir, the prosecution
3 points out no specific places in the document where
4 those faults can be found.

5 THE PRESIDENT: He said there is argument
6 in every paragraph.

7 MR. BLEWETT: This witness was the chief
8 of the First Section, which had charge of the entire
9 operational planning.

10 THE PRESIDENT: He could tell us the con-
11 siderations that influenced the Japanese in doing what
12 they did without expressing any opinions of his own.

13 MR. BLEWETT: Sir, they are not opinions.
14 He was the chief of that bureau. That is policy.

15 As the Tribunal no doubt noticed, the evidence
16 in this phase of the case has been circumscribed and
17 we tried to put it in the most forceful and the best
18 method of presentation. Rather than bring in a host
19 of documents from various sources, we concentrated
20 upon this witness to give all the information which we
21 thought necessary and expedient and helpful to the
22 Tribunal. We took great pains with the affidavit and
23 tried to put it in the best shape possible for the
24 presentation, despite the translation difficulties.
25

It refers to various other documents that

1 have heretofore been put in, and it has really been
2 worked up, we think, quite advantageously.

3 THE PRESIDENT: He may express some opinions
4 which are matters for us, but it does appear to me to
5 be to a very large extent devoted to stating what did
6 influence the Japanese in doing what they did. I can
7 see no objection to that. I think we are inclined to
8 admit it, although we have some misgivings about parts.

9 The objection is overruled and the document
10 admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1661
12 will receive exhibit No. 3027.

13 (Whereupon, the document above
14 referred to was marked defense exhibit
15 No. 3027 and received in evidence.)

16 MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 3027.

17 "I was on duty as chief of the first section
18 (operational planning) in the General Staff Office from
19 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942. Now I shall
20 depose here about the operational plan and preparations
21 against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands
22 in which I took part in the past.

23 "First I shall explain the operational plan
24 and preparations for the year 1941. In the conference
25 for the 1941's peacetime operations plan held in the

1 winter of 1940, the Chief of the General Staff adopted
2 a draft for the southern operations, which was almost
3 the same in contents with that of the previous year.
4 In other words, the draft was a purely technical pro-
5 vision for defensive operations, a program which the
6 Supreme Command used to make annually as a part of
7 general peacetime national defence plan. This draft
8 has been burned and is not available for the present.
9 However, I am sure I can tell the following facts
10 according to my recollections.

11 "a. A major part of the peacetime operations
12 plan for the Japanese army consisted of defensive
13 preparations against the Soviet Union, in point of
14 quantity as well as quality.

15 "Therefore in deciding upon an annual
16 peacetime operational plan, the thing to be done
17 first of all was usually to define an outline of the
18 anti-Soviet defensive plan (its rough projects, forces
19 and materials needed for it, etc.) laying aside all
20 other considerations for the time being. It was only
21 after this was finished that the operational plan
22 for the South came up for consideration.

23 "It was as it were secondary and supplementary
24 in importance. No stress was laid upon it, sometimes
25 it was nothing more than a paper plan in rough and

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1 abstract form. It was not too much to say that
2 nothing concrete was found in the operational prepa-
3 rations for the South. The plan projected for the
4 year 1941 was also of the same nature.
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1 "b. According to the design in the above
2 program, if a war should break out between Japan
3 and the United States, measures to be taken were
4 limited to the occupation of the Philippines and Guam
5 and in consequence the capture of American military
6 bases in the Far East. It never contained in any
7 sense detailed plans or preparations against possible
8 attack from the mainland of the United States which
9 might have been expected to follow as a necessary
10 consequence in such an event.

11 "An Anti-American operational plan would
12 have been projected as against a possible over-all
13 attack by the main forces of the United States. If
14 it were so, the extent and scope of the plan would
15 have been wider and more complicated in anticipation
16 of a protracted war. In this case the question when
17 and where would be the end of the war would have
18 been a key point to decide beforehand.

19 "The Japanese operations plan, however,
20 never referred to this essential point and touched
21 only upon operations against the American military
22 bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against
23 Hawaii, not to speak of the mainland, was not taken
24 into account in the plan. The reasons were that
25 priority was given to the defensive plan and moreover

1 that our national power could not stand such operations.
2 Another important reason was that Japan's sole aim was
3 to drive away the imminent threats. It was entirely
4 unnecessary further to wage war with the United States.
5 This was the fundamental attitude of the Japanese
6 army in making up the year 1941's plan and had been
7 so in the annual programs that preceded it. As to
8 Britain the following was the measures to be worked
9 out by 1941's plan, in case a war should break out
10 with her: It is true that we had the idea, in case of
11 war to capture first her military bases in the Far
12 East, such as Singapore or Hong Kong, but no concrete
13 plans were prepared for that. Burma, India, Australia,
14 and other British territories were never contemplated
15 in the plan. It was the same also with the Nether-
16 lands East Indies. The actual conditions did not
17 allow Japan to plan simultaneous operations against
18 more than two countries including the United States,
19 Britain and the Netherlands, as she had not sufficient
20 military forces and national resources to venture such
21 a war. On the other hand, inasmuch as it was very
22 difficult to foresee the development of such a many-
23 sided war it was admitted that in such a case we
24 should have somehow to combine the separate plans
25 originally designed as against individual nations

1 into an over-all plan of operation. The Supreme
2 Command, however, had of course an idea to take some
3 political measures as far as possible not to launch
4 such simultaneous operations.

5 "c. The above-mentioned strategy meant
6 that we should, at the outset of war, check their
7 attack in a passive way for a while and afterwards
8 take an offensive and thus maintain defensive atti-
9 tude. Of course, we expected that, according to the
10 progress of operations, in some cases it might be
11 necessary to cope with the offensive of the enemy, to
12 give up fruitless passiveness and to turn to an effec-
13 tive counterattack as soon as possible.

14 "However, in view of the insufficiency of
15 operational preparations that could be expected
16 within 1941, it was quite clear at the beginning of
17 that year that not only in the earlier months but also
18 as late as at the end of the year we would be still
19 unable even to carry out the passive formulae of
20 operation, not to speak of checking at once an
21 offensive attack from some country. In this connec-
22 tion, detailed accounts shall be given in a later
23 paragraph.

24 "It was generally admitted that the prepa-
25 rations had to be completed only through steady and

1 continual efforts over a long period, because of
2 Japan's poor condition in strategic resources, war
3 funds, and munitions production. It was because
4 we had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis,
5 if once it happened, with drastic measures on a
6 grand scale. So the incompleteness of preparations
7 meant complete impossibility to make operations.
8 These facts clearly show that the plan for the year
9 together with its preparatory programs could not
10 meet even the requirements of the defensive opera-
11 tional plan for 1941.
12

13 "d. The peacetime operations program for
14 1941 was drafted and decided upon by the General
15 Staff Office as stated in the foregoing explanations,
16 but a further study was never attempted for framing
17 a concrete policy. No permanent army headquarters
18 had yet come into being standing on a permanent
19 foothold to be in charge of execution of southern
20 operations in case of a crisis. Even divisions neces-
21 sary for the operation had not yet been designated.

22 "3. Here I am going to explain some facts
23 in relation to the drafting of peacetime operational
24 plan for 1941.

25 "a. The care of the peacetime operational
plan for 1941 lay in the basic policy of Japan to:

1 avoid, in view of the current state of things both
2 within and without, any over-all war with other
3 countries, so that Japan might devote all her efforts
4 to the solution of the China Incident; to try to bring
5 the South problems then pending between Japan and
6 other countries to a prompt settlement by some means
7 short of war; and above all to block the so-called
8 Aid-Chiang routes of the Third Powers. These were
9 the points which General SUGIYAMA, Gen, Chief of the
10 General Staff, who was in charge of command over the
11 General Staff Office as a whole and of national
12 defense and tactics pointed out as essential to the
13 drafting of operational plans, when he gave an in-
14 struction to me, chief of the first section (in
15 charge of operations) as well as to Lt. General
16 TSUKADA, Osamu, Vice-Chief of the General Staff Office
17 (who was in charge of controlling general affairs and
18 of adjusting policy and strategy).

19 "b. Why war should be averted from strategi-
20 cal points of view was clear from the following cir-
21 cumstances: In the winter of 1941 at the drafting
22 conference of the plan for the following year, the
23 number of forces needed for wartime emergency was
24 estimated by the War Ministry at forty-eight divisions
25 in total. If they were divided into a few groups

1 which would be dispatched each for one quarter,
2 namely, about thirty divisions for anti-Soviet
3 defense, about ten divisions for the China operations,
4 five divisions for guarding against the United States
5 and Britain, and a few divisions in reserve for the
6 Imperial Headquarters, there would have been no
7 doubt big shortage of forces in every quarter.
8 It was true especially with regard to the amount of
9 tanks, motorcars, communication facilities and
10 liquid fuels. Further, in anticipation of a crisis
11 with the United States and Britain in the future,
12 considerable increase was required above all in the
13 number of army corps for defensive purposes in this
14 direction, amounting to at least a little more than
15 ten divisions in the early period of emergency. There-
16 fore, there should have been prepared about ten divisions
17 for the China operations, a little more than twenty
18 divisions for the anti-Soviet defense and a few in
19 reserve for the Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of
20 the General Staff recognized that, in such a case,
21 shortage of armed forces and war materials would be
22 much more acute and such a war would compel us to leave
23 the China Incident completely fruitless. The Chief
24 further concluded that Japan should keep up a policy to
25 avert a wholesale war from the viewpoints of both

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1 politics and strategy. In this respect, I understood,
2 the War Minister also had agreed in opinion with
3 the Chief.
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1 "(c) Besides, in framing the plan, the
2 following matters underwent special examination in an
3 interview I had with the Vice-Chief of the General
4 Staff in my capacity as Chief of the Operations
5 Section of the General Staff. The question was in
6 what the strategy of the Japanese Army would be
7 affected by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance
8 Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. The discussion
9 was held in November of 1940, and the result was as
10 given below:

11 "The general view held by the Vice-Chief was
12 mainly that Japan should be every means avert any re-
13 sort to arms in so far as the justice and fame of our
14 nation be maintained, however imminent the compulsion
15 of the Tripartite Pact. I agreed with him on this
16 point. The conclusion, of course, was a result of con-
17 sideration from a purely strategical point of view.
18 The final decision whether to resort to arms or not
19 was a matter left to our state policy. The question
20 whether or not any of the contracting parties to the
21 Tripartite Pact was really attacked by the United
22 States, was a matter for future judgment which was to
23 be decided in relation with the circumstances at that
24 time and from a fair and independent viewpoint. We
25 ought to keep up this attitude with a firm belief and

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1 make a due judgment in view of the whole destiny of
2 our nation. In case Japan should be attacked from
3 the United States, Germany would, of course, give us
4 a military aid of some sort. However, considering
5 the fact that Germany was then absorbed in the European
6 wars and that her military power was never limitless
7 and besides in view of the circumstance that Germany
8 was not a big naval power and situated remote from
9 East Asia and the Western Pacific, (an expected
10 battlefield in case of a war between Japan and the
11 United States) the Japanese Army could not expect a
12 strategical aid from Germany. On the other hand, in
13 case Germany should be attacked by the United States,
14 Japan would be obliged to give aid to Germany by arms.
15 Japan, however, could not afford to engage in military
16 operations against the United States exclusively for
17 the purpose of aiding Germany. On the contrary, she
18 had to devote herself to her own independent operations
19 in order to complete a general national defense. In
20 case a war should break out between the United States
21 and Germany, we should find out some measures or other
22 to meet the circumstance. It was especially the case
23 at that time when the Japanese Army had no surplus in
24 armed forces.
25

"These were the gist of the conclusion.

1 "The Chief of the General Staff approved
2 the above conclusion and made clear his views in
3 agreement with the Vice-Chief that the 1941 peace-
4 time operations plan should be designed and established
5 from an independent viewpoint; that it should not be
6 restricted or given any support from outside; and
7 that it should not be influenced in strategy by the
8 conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact. The 1941
9 peacetime operations plan was founded upon this prin-
10 ciple.

11 "C. As to preparations accompanying the 1941
12 peacetime operations plan, I recognized that they were
13 lacking in thoroughness, for the Southern operations
14 (for defense) were left out of consideration in the
15 plan and therefore these areas remained untouched or
16 without defense.

17 "(a) For the South, even the study prerequi-
18 site for the defense of that area was left incomplete
19 or untouched as to organization, equipment, materials
20 and training of forces to be employed for landing and
21 tropical operations.

22 "For although the most urgent and immediate
23 need of the time was to reform the organization and
24 equipment of a part of army forces and give them
25 special training so that they might be used for the

1 Southern operations against the United States and
2 Britain as provided in the peacetime national defense
3 plan, it could hardly be expected that these prepar-
4 ations would be finished even in their crude form by
5 the summer of 1941, if it be set about at once.

6 "In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was
7 laid on the completion of defense in Manchuria against
8 the Soviet by reorganizing each division so as to
9 adapt it to operations in continental climate, espec-
10 ially in the cold wildernesses of North Manchuria. The
11 organization and equipment thus prepared for the troops
12 were entirely opposite in nature to those for the South.
13 Particularly, transport goods to be accomodated for
14 each division was of a great amount, and a majority of
15 horses for transport and communication was expected to
16 be Manchurian ponies. From this it was clear that the
17 Japanese Army laid greater stress upon the defensive
18 operations against the Soviet Union than upon those
19 against the United States and Britain, even at the
20 beginning of the period covered by the 1941 operations
21 and mobilization plan, that is, in April 1941. As for
22 the equipment of army airplanes, only sixty or seventy
23 percent out of the original mobilization plan was ex-
24 pected to be reached before August, 1941. Among them,
25 especially, heavy bombers which had been originally

1 designed for defensive purposes for the Manchurian-
2 Soviet frontier, had but a small flying range and were
3 not well fitted for Southern operations. As stated
4 in the above paragraph, aviation facilities on the
5 whole were not available for Southern operations.

6 "(b) As regards the stock of ammunitions
7 for operational purposes, only a small amount was piled
8 up for the Southern operations during the period between
9 the spring and the summer of 1941. At the end of
10 September and later in October, there was accumulated
11 an additional amount and afterwards, until December,
12 it reached in total barely to the amount available for
13 some ten divisions at the most. The accumulation,
14 however, had not been calculated in the aforesaid
15 preparations which had been based upon 1941's peace-
16 time operations plan, but it was carried out chiefly
17 after the determination of national policy.

18 "(c) As mentioned before, the preparations
19 in the 1941 plan meant chiefly: reorganization and
20 training of several divisions so as to fit them for
21 the guard and defense in the South; study of tactics
22 in the tropics; study of landing tactics; collection
23 of information and strategical materials. They were
24 essential matters of study for framing a peacetime
25 national defense and were not the prerequisites for the

1 execution of wars against the United States, Britain
2 and Holland. Moreover, it was too late in commencement
3 and was not rapid in progress. In addition to this,
4 information concerning the South, particularly mili-
5 tary conditions, weather, topography, land and marine
6 meteorology were found incomplete and no bases were
7 prepared for aviation, sea transport and communication
8 activities.

9 "(d) In view of the actual condition as
10 above stated as well as the expected progress of
11 preparations within the designated year, even passive
12 and defensive operations were hard to put into effect.
13 Much more difficult was the plan to make a responsive
14 attack after defensive actions or an instant counter-
15 attack against the enemy's offensive.

16 "We tried, however, to meet at least the
17 minimum requirements of defensive preparations in an
18 effort to make up for such shortages in the preparations.

19 "There were many difficulties found in the
20 way of execution due to the want of military funds and
21 materials in the Army Ministry and the insufficiency of
22 investigation by the Supreme Command. It was not before
23 September of the year that preparations in organizing
24 armed forces and war materials were first launched.
25 They were to a greater extent applications from those

1 originally prepared for the defense against the Soviets,
2 or some such modifications for meeting an emergency.

3 "III. I shall state here about the plan and
4 preparations which were adopted after the decision on
5 a national policy was arrived at as a result of the
6 Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, (Exhibit 588.)

7 "A. On 2 July, immediately after the decision
8 of a national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the
9 General Staff gave the following explanations to the
10 chiefs of all sections in his staff in connection with
11 the problem of the United States and Britain, which
12 had been fully discussed at the Conference. Above all
13 he stressed the need of propelling the once-fixed
14 policy and accordingly the study and preparations for
15 moving into South French Indo-China.

16 "(a) The fixed principles should not be
17 changed fundamentally as to the solution of the China
18 Incident. We should, ~~however~~, strengthen pressure upon
19 Chungking from the South and check up the routes for
20 helping Chiang Kai-shek. While, on the other hand, if
21 circumstances admit, we should exercise belligerent
22 rights against Chungking and take over hostile foreign
23 settlements into our hands. We must pay utmost vigi-
24 lance to every circumstance, especially to the United
25 States and Britain, in taking up such measures. The

1 pressure upon Chungking from the South had to be
2 effected also by the practical application of policies
3 already established toward French Indo-China. It was
4 an urgent need to dispose of the hostile foreign
5 settlements in China, as they were presenting a great
6 obstacle in the way of settling the China Incident.
7 It was more desirable to solve it through diplomatic
8 means, but, if circumstances do not admit, we should
9 have to take them over by force through the New
10 Central Government of China. In that case, there would
11 be some danger of strained relations with the Anglo-
12 Americans. Something more serious than the occupation
13 of South French Indo-China might happen in diplomatic
14 relations with those countries. Therefore, we must
15 never be in haste in the solution. This was the reason
16 why foreign settlements in China were decided to be
17 taken over, if the case required it. Anyhow we must
18 be ready, if the worst comes, not to evade a defensive
19 war against the Anglo-Americans.
20

21 "(b) The Southern policy was made up general-
22 ly on the basis of the once-fixed national policy and
23 aimed at the advancement of troops into South French
24 Indo-China. The policy especially confirmed the need
25 of maintaining readiness for a war against the United
States and Britain. Nevertheless, it did not mean

1 Japan was determined to make a war. It only admitted
2 that, if Japan should suffer a military interference
3 from the United States and Great Britain in the way
4 of executing her policy toward Siam and French Indo-
5 China through peaceful and diplomatic means, she would
6 never shun operations for self-defense in those areas.
7 In that case, every effort was to be paid to avoid
8 armed forces entering Siam. As to the real purport of
9 the expression of 'not to evade war towards Britain
10 and America' in the above decision, it has been under-
11 stood from the atmosphere of the Imperial Conference
12 itself and the real intention of the Navy, that by
13 them it was expected that Japan would successfully
14 carry out her policy in peace toward French Indo-
15 China and Siam, without causing any trouble with the
16 Anglo-Americans, if she paid possible efforts for the
17 cause. The expression that Japan was not afraid of
18 war with the United States and Britain meant only that
19 we would not be in danger of stimulating a war by tak-
20 ing a policy toward French Indo-China, however, any
21 interference or challenge from Anglo-Americans, if
22 they were turned toward us, might cause an unexpected
23 situation; thus, we should make a careful preparation
24 for carrying out a policy toward French Indo-China and
25 should have a firm determination to get ready for the

1 worst. We also foresaw a future time on the side of
2 the Army, when our defensive activities would be
3 greatly enlarged to permit us a more careful con-
4 sideration of Southern problems, as our preparations
5 were not ready as compared with those against the
6 Soviet Union and China. Anyhow, in view of the
7 situation where Japan's sphere of defense was en-
8 larged up to French Indo-China, the first step to be
9 taken was a practical study of operations plan against
10 the United States and Britain from various points of
11 view.

1 "(c) The outbreak of war between Germany
2 and the Soviet Union was making extremely pointed the
3 relations between Japan and the Union. In addition
4 American aid to the Soviet Union and the construction of
5 military bases by the United States in the Soviet
6 territory in the Far East were making the Japanese-
7 Soviet relations more intricate and serious. In this
8 respect, special consideration must be given in connection
9 with the Anglo-American problems.

10 "(d) In the conference held on 2 July, every
11 member in attendance expressed the same desire to carry
12 out a peaceful advancement following the international
13 treaties as far as possible. The War Minister also dis-
14 closed his intention to do his best in order not to cause
15 any trouble at the time of advancement, as had happened
16 formerly in North French Indo-China last autumn. The
17 Supreme Command, calculating on this, intended to dispatch
18 the Imperial Guard Division then stationed in South
19 China to French Indo-China in order to complete the
20 advancement. For this casue, we decided to make good
21 use of the results of investigation made last June and
22 establish an intimate cooperation and communication
23 between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff,
24 especially in adjusting the relations between politics
25 and military operations.

1 "(e) The Chief of the General Staff, who had
2 agreed in view with the Government and the Army General
3 Staff late in June 1941, pointed out that the aim of
4 advancement of South French Indo-China, was both to cut
5 the Chiang Kai-shek route formerly established there and
6 thus to contribute to the establishment of economic
7 autonomy of Japan. He further stressed that with this
8 in view, we should first of all secure friendship and
9 reliance from French Indo-China. Moreover, he stated
10 to the following effect:

11 "(f) Both the Central authorities of the Army
12 and the troops on the spot should pay full respect to the
13 sovereignty and territorial integrity and other rights
14 of France with an understanding that the Japanese
15 Embassy in French Indo-China and the troops on the spot
16 must not fail to make control and communication between
17 themselves, and in connection with this a decisive measure
18 for control must be taken among the stationed troops.
19 Even common soldiers must be fully aware that every mis-
20 understanding or disagreement should be avoided by both
21 peoples due to the difference in manners, customs and
22 languages of the two nations. This he emphasized at the
23 conference for the mapping out of the advancement
24 program.
25

1 "B. I give the following as a supplement to
2 the above statement in relations to the stationing of
3 troops in South French Indo-China.

4 "(a) As to the possibility of peaceful advance-
5 ment into South French Indo-China, General SUGIYAMA,
6 the Chief of the General Staff, clarified his view early
7 in July that Japan did not take French Indo-China for
8 an enemy and the advancement was not in the nature of a
9 military occupation. He concluded that there as a favor-
10 able prospect on the side of France to admit a peaceful
11 advance, on condition that we could convince them of the
12 purpose of our stationing of troops, though it would not
13 be an easy task. Early in July, it was informed that
14 Britain might march into French Indo-China beforehand,
15 as she was aware of our intention to make advancement
16 there. Anxiety would prevail among us if this would cause
17 any untoward accident at the time of our occupation.
18 The Chief believed that our attitude, if maintained
19 just, fair and firm, would not give rise to any trouble
20 by the conduct of British Armies.

22 "(b) The invasion of Chinese Armies into
23 North French Indo-China was at this time a matter of
24 great concern for the Central authorities of the Army
25 and for the dispatched forces stationed in South China
and French Indo-China. Early in July, information

1 reached us that three divisions of Chungking's Army,
2 hitherto stationed near the border between China and
3 French Indo-China, received an order to enter into
4 French Indo-China. In order to meet this situation,
5 the first section of the General Staff made a secret
6 study of a plan of reinforcing one regiment of infantry,
7 if needed temporarily, and moreover even to dispatch
8 one division then stationed in Canton. On the other
9 hand, early in 1941, the General Staff gave out information
10 to the effect that Chinese forces amounting to four armies
11 or about 16 divisions were stationed in face of French
12 Indo-China, in the districts of Lungchow, Tsinghsí and
13 Mengtze, Chinese territories adjacent to the districts
14 of Langson and Laokay, situated at the northeast border
15 of French Indo-China.
16

17 "C. As already mentioned, the Chief of the
18 General Staff asked on 2 July 1941, shortly after the
19 Imperial Conference, to make a thorough investigation
20 upon the strategy toward the United States and Britain.
21 Following this, at the end of July, when the advancement
22 of troops into South French Indo-China was put into
23 operation, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the
24 Chief of the first section were urged by the Chief of the
25 General Staff for the promotion of the study. The results
of the investigation at that time were like below:

1 "(a) The preparations generally required at
2 the time, were put into practice within the limits of the
3 already-fixed plan established early in the year. They
4 were: -- studies in various fields of operations, studies
5 of defensive plans to meet a critical situation on the
6 basis of the peacetime annual plan; and new investigations
7 and preparations for the defense of French Indo-China
8 on the principle of Franco-Japanese Mutual Defense
9 Agreement.

10 "Detailed accounts of preparations were made
11 also within the scope of the established policy including
12 the promotion of training, equipments, supplies and
13 sanitation. It was an urgent need to make up for the
14 loss suffered in the operations in China.

15 "(b) The decision of national policy reached
16 on 2 July and its consequent result, the Franco-Japanese
17 military cooperation for the mutual defense of French
18 Indo-China, had its aim in the protection of that area
19 from the United States and Britain. The matter had
20 never been imagined in the past annual operations plans.
21 It was a new theme claiming a totally different study and
22 preparations on the part of the General Staff. Our
23 armed forces stationed in French Indo-China after the
24 occupation of the Southern part of that area amounted to
25 one brigade and one flying corps (two companies) for

1 North French Indo-China and one division (in order not
2 to interfere with the Japanese-American diplomatic
3 negotiations, no forces except the airdrome engineers
4 corps were stationed there in addition to the above one
5 division) were assigned for the defense of French Indo-
6 China from the threat of invasion by the United States,
7 Britain and De Gaulle regime or the invasion or other
8 aggressions by the Chinese forces. The General Staff,
9 not going farther beyond the limit of an informal study
10 on the reinforcement of units which had been reserved
11 for crisis in China and Formosa, left further measures
12 to the Army on the spot. While, construction of air bases
13 and installation of communication facilities were going
14 on according to the provisions of official agreement
15 reached between Japan and France, other measures were
16 also taken into consideration as shown in the above state-
17 ment.

18 "(c) It was likely that Japanese operational
19 measures for self-defense against the United States and
20 Britain which might follow the mutual defense agreement
21 with French Indo-China or other similar circumstances,
22 would naturally cover the main areas (such as Malay, the
23 Philippines), and would develop into military operations
24 necessary for defending the Japanese homeland. Therefore,
25 it became a pressing need to propel a further study in

1 the operational plan in anticipation of a future
2 situation. The Chief of the General Staff then requested
3 the Vice-Chief and the Chief of the First Section to
4 promote the study on the plan, including the study
5 of operations in the tropics, on the sea, in the air and
6 of landing in areas such as the Philippines, Malay,
7 Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bismark Islands, Guam, etc. Like-
8 wise, the Chief of the Second Section was asked to collect
9 informations and materials on military affairs in the
10 South and the Chief of the Third Section was given an
11 instruction to speed up a study on the war materials for
12 ocean and landing operations.

13 "IV. I shall now explain matters in connection
14 with the operations plan and preparations after the
15 decision on national policy made as a result of the
16 Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941. (Exhibit 588)

17 "A. In early September 1941 the Chief of the
18 Army General Staff at a meeting attended by the Vice-
19 Chief of Staff and chiefs of departments explained the
20 items in the above-mentioned national policy which
21 related to the United States and Great Britain, the gist
22 being as follows:

23 "In short, it was a request for reconsideration
24 of the operations plan and the furtherance of or the
25 making of a new start in the operational preparations

1 in order to cope with the situation.

2 "1. The national policy decided on 6 September
3 reflects a strong consciousness of the critical importance
4 of national defense. In other words, the question of
5 how to cope with the present critical situation,
6 especially the offensive actions of the United States,
7 Britain and the Netherlands toward Japan and of how to
8 cope with the reality of the daily diminishing resilience
9 of our national strength in the face of the Anglo-American
10 freezing of our assets, especially the embargo on oil,
11 the complete loss of which is now but a matter of time --
12 how to cope with this critically grave situation and how
13 to save the fate of the nation -- these are questions
14 which our country must answer. In order to solve these
15 questions and in crying need as our country is of measures
16 to surmount the difficulties, even in the event of our
17 falling into the worst possible situation, it has been
18 decided to pursue our diplomacy and war preparations with
19 an attitude of making efforts for peace, but ready to
20 fight if peace fails. This is what the national policy
21 decision provides for. For this purpose it was decided
22 that, while seeking the attainment of the objectives of
23 the negotiations with a time limit on the one hand, com-
24 pletion of war preparations with a time limit shall be
25 made with a resolve to meet possible eventualities when

1 war against the United States (Great Britain and the
2 Netherlands) is unavoidable from the standpoint of self-
3 preservation and self-defense. The nation's position on
4 peace or war is to be decided in the early part of
5 October (1941). These are the matters the aforementioned
6 national policy decision provides for.* In short, the
7 decision on national policy both in name and in fact is
8 not a decision resolving on war, but a decision whose
9 object is to bring about a new turn in the situation
10 through diplomacy. The hastening of defensive war
11 preparations is directed against the offensive actions
12 of the Powers against Japan with a will not to evade war
13 in case war cannot be averted. It should be emphasized
14 that the primary principal of the decision is to attain
15 our objective through diplomacy."

16 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break,
17 Mr. Blewett. We will adjourn until half-past nine
18 tomorrow morning.

19 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
20 was taken until Thursday, 28 August 1947 at
21 0930.)

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